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I. Introduction 
. . .  "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is 
not a knight-errant, roaming at will in  pursuit of his own ideal of 
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from con- 
secrated prin~iples."~ 
Several years before the United States Supreme Court an- 
nounced for the first time in McNabb v. United States2 its "su- 
pervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice 
in the federal courts,"3 Benjamin Cardozo, then-Chief Judge of 
the New York Court of Appeals, reflected, in dicta, upon the na- 
ture and scope of this power.4 In People ex rel. Lemon v. 
Supreme Court,5 the court affirmed an order prohibiting the 
judge in a murder case from requiring the district attorney to 
disclose to the defense written statements taken from witnesses 
during the investigation.6 Cardozo went on to assay "the exist- 
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). 
2. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
3. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 341. 
4. The term "supervisory power" has been used by the Supreme Court, lower 
federal courts, and state courts, to encompass a broad judicial authority over the 
administration of justice. I am using the term to identify this power in the same 
fashion that it has been identified by the courts and commentators, notwithstand- 
ing criticism that the term is overly simplistic, occasionally misleading, and should 
be abandoned. See Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal 
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of Federal Courts, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1433,1520 (1984); Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervi- 
sory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181,214 (1969). 
Commentary has centered almost exclusively on the exercise of supervisory 
power by the federal courts. See generally Beale, supra; Hill, supra; Murray M. 
Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory Power by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 
27 VILL. L. REV. 506 (1982); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term - 
Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HAFW. L. REV. 1 (1975); James E. Hogan 
& Joseph M. Snee, The "McNabb-Mallory" Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 
GEO. L. J. 1 (1958); Note, A Separation of Powers Approach to the Supervisory 
Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 427 (1982); Note, The Supervisory 
Power of the Federal Courts, 76 IIARv. L. REV. 1656 (1963). I have been unable to 
find in the journals any discussion of the exercise by state courts of a supervisory 
power similar to that exercised by federal courts. 
5. 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927). 
6. Id. at 28, 156 N.E. at 84. 
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ence of an inherent power in courts of criminal jurisdiction to 
compel the discovery of documents in furtherance of justice."7 
Finding "glimmerings of such a doctrine" in earlier common law 
decisions: but hesitating to  "affirm or deny" its existence? he 
left the battlefield open for some future encounter. He 
concluded: 
Whether apart from statute and beyond it there is a supervisory 
jurisdiction, as yet unplumbed and unexhausted, in respect of 
criminal prosecutions, is something that can best be determined 
at the call of particular exigencies in the setting of the concrete 
instance. The courts are properly reluctant to abjure the power in 
advance, or to confine in predetermined formulas the occasions for 
its exercise.1° 
Whereas the federal courts since McNabb applied supervi- 
sory power in hundreds of cases, and in a variety of circum- 
stances,ll the New York courts have been far more reticent 
about invoking, or even formulating, a doctrine of supervisory 
jurisdiction.12 Cardozo was typically prescient in anticipating 
this judicial reluctance to recognize a supervisory jurisdiction 
over criminal prosecutions.l3 Nevertheless, the New York 
courts have in fact exercised a limited supervisory power over 
7. Id. at 32, 156 N.E. a t  86. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. See Beale, supra note 4, a t  1433. 
12. See discussion infra part V. "Jurisdiction is a word of elastic, diverse, and 
disparate meanings." Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 74,359 N.E.2d 384,388,390 
N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (1976) (Breitel, C.J.). The term is used in connection with su- 
pervisory authority to denote judicial power in its most basic sense. That is the 
sense, I believe, in which Cardozo used the term in Lemon. In this sense, jurisdic- 
tion is determined by asking whether a court has the legal power to decide the 
issue, and whether the court ought to decide it. See infra notes 75-111 and accom- 
panying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing 
jurisdiction in terms of judicial power). But see CHARLES WARREN, THE M~UUNG OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 331-32 (1928) ("It is always important to bear in mind that 
there is a vital distinction between a Court's jurisdiction and a Court's power."). 
The questions of judicial power and judicial policy are the dominant themes of this 
Article. 
13. Supervisory power has also been applied in the civil context. See, e.g., 
Sarac v. Bertash; 148 A.D.2d 436, 538 N.Y.S.2d 588 (2d Dep't 1989) (disallowing 
testimony of witnesses a t  trial who failed to appear for depositions); Bankers Trust 
Co. v. Braten, 101 Misc. 2d 227, 420 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) 
(assignment of single judge to supervise complex litigation); see also Thiel v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946). 
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criminal justice and have done so in a manner strikingly similar 
to the exercise of their traditional common law power to formu- 
late rules of procedure, evidence, and substance.14 
However, in contrast to the federal courts, the New York 
courts have never actually formulated a doctrine of supervisory 
jurisdiction, nor have the courts carefully analyzed the princi- 
ples underlying the exercise of such power. The decisions most 
often are guarded, ad hoc, unreasoned, and inconsistent. 
This is not surprising. For as the federal cases recognize, 
and the much more limited New York variants confirm, super- 
visory power may be perceived as lacking doctrinal stability and 
criticized as an illegitimate form of judicial overreaching.15 In- 
deed, the nature of the doctrine itself accounts for the dearth of 
legal analysis. 
Supervisory power involves a fundamental conflict between 
the proper allocation of governmental functions, on the one 
hand, and the achievement of justice on the other.16 Moreover, 
as a sub-constitutional common law doctrine designed to en- 
force civilized standards of procedure and evidence, supervisory 
power invokes "the spirit of the Constitution,"l7 rather than the 
text. As such, it becomes a highly useful weapon in the arsenal 
of judicial power, but a highly vulnerable one as well. 
This Article discusses the role of supervisory power in the 
judicial culture of New York. In order to place supervisory 
power in a context, Part I1 outlines the emergence and decline 
of supervisory power in the federal system. Part I11 then traces 
the origin of supervisory power in New York to Cardozo's dic- 
tum in Lemon. Part IV explains how supervisory power is an 
14. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. 
15. Much the same criticism is encountered when the Supreme Court inter- 
prets the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment to formulate new constitu- 
tional protections. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent- 
ing); see also John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82 YALE L.J. 920, 948-49 (1973). Constitutional theorists would characterize this 
exercise of judicial power as "noninterpretavism," in the sense that it authorizes 
judges to go beyond the establishment of norms that are clearly stated or implied 
in the constitutional text, and seek to enforce norms that cannot be discovered 
within that text. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980). 
16. See discussion i n j k  part V. 
17. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567-68, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1976). 
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aspect of the much broader inherent judicial power, which finds 
expression in the familiar common law decision-making pro- 
cess. Part V discusses three principal areas in which supervi- 
sory power has been exercised by New York courts since 
Cardozo: formulating rules of discovery, regulating grand jury 
practice, and fashioning remedies for governmental misconduct. 
Finally, Part VI demonstrates that supervisory power is a legit- 
imate exercise of judicial authority based on two distinct theo- 
ries: as a sub-constitutional common law of justice and fair 
dealing, and as an integral part of the court's inherent common 
law power to formulate rules for the proper administration of 
justice. 
11. Rise and Fall of Supervisory Power in the Federal Courts 
In McNabb v. United States,ls Justice Felix Frankfurter ob- 
served that the federal courts have "the duty of establishing and 
maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" that 
are broader in scope than protections afforded by the Constitu- 
tion or statutes.lg "In the exercise of its supervisory authority 
over the administration of criminal justice in the federal 
courts," he wrote, judges should be "guided by considerations of 
justice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary rele- 
vance."20 In McNabb and its companion case, Anderson v. 
United States,21 incriminating statements were obtained by the 
police from suspects who were held incommunicado and interro- 
gated for up to several days until some of them confessed.22 
Although there was no proof of coercion, nor any suggestion 
that the defendants' constitutional rights were otherwise in- 
fringed, the Court held that this prolonged detention was in 
"flagrant disregard" of statutory requirements mandating that 
a person taken into custody be promptly arraigned before a ju- 
dicial officer.23 The Court reversed the convictions based on the 
defendants' admissions.2* To allow a conviction to  stand based 
18. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
19. Id. at 340-41. 
20. Id. at 341. 
21. 318 U.S. 350 (1943). 
22. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 334-38; Anderson, 318 U.S. at 352-55. 
23. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345. 
24. Id. at 347. 
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on unlawfully secured evidence would make "the courts them- 
selves accomplices in willful disobedience of law."25 Thus, the 
Court created an exclusionary rule to remedy the government's 
misconduct - a defendant's confession would be suppressed if 
it was acquired during a period of unreasonable delay between 
custody and arraignment.26 
In the fifty years since McNabb, the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts have applied supervisory power in nu- 
merous cases.27 Indeed, the exercise of such power has "become 
commonplace in every circuit . . .  ."28 Although the source of this 
power and the circumstances justifying judicial intervention are 
disputed29 and barely articulated by the courts, its underlying 
rationale traditionally has been understood as twofold - to  de- 
ter governmental misconduct and to preserve judicial integ- 
rity.30 Thus, supervisory power has been invoked by the federal 
courts to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence,31 to regulate 
discovery and disclosure of evidence,32 to prevent abuse of grand 
25. Id. at 345. As Professor Hill observed, McNabb was properly the subject 
of "judicial law-making in aid of the fair and efficient operation of the judicial pro- 
cess . . . ." Hill, supra note 4, at 198. The defendants were "poorly educated federal 
prisoners, . . . the confessions were the 'crux' of the government's case," and the 
conduct of the federal law enforcement officials raised significant doubts as to 
whether the confessions were trustworthy. Id. a t  197 (citing McNabb, 318 U.S. a t  
338). 
26. McNabb was reaffirmed in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 
(1957) (holding that while certain "[c]ircumstances may justify a brief delay be- 
tween arrest and arraignment. . . the delay must not be of a nature to give oppor- 
tunity for the extraction of a confession"). The McNabb-Mallory rule, as it came to 
be known, was heavily criticized by law enforcement officials and members of Con- 
gress. Most states refused to adopt the rule. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 428-29 (7th ed. 1990). 
27. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88, affd on reh'g, 483 
F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing 30 such cases). 
28. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1456. 
29. Compare Beale, supra note 4, at 1520-22 (contending that supervisory 
power lacks authority in federal law and that the term should be abandoned) with 
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 34-38 (contending that supervisory power is an appro- 
priate form of federal common law). 
30. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 n.8 (1980). 
31. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960); Mallory v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 449,455-56 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 
(1943). 
32. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231, 240-41 (1975); Jencks v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 657. 672 (1957). 
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jury process and authority,33 to oversee summary contempt,34 to 
require fairness in the jury selection to mandate 
speedy trials,36 to impose upon prosecutors ethical and profes- 
sional standards,37 and to devise sanctions for misconduct by 
government officials.38 
However, the federal judicial effort to  impose extra-consti- 
tutional standards on governmental behavior was controversial 
and short-lived; the rise and fall of supervisory power resembles 
a parabolic arc, beginning with McNabb, reaching its crest dur- 
ing the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, and then descending 
precipitously during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Several 
reasons account for the demise of supervisory power in the fed- 
eral courts. First, supervisory power requires judges to impose 
on government officials their own "notions of good policy."39 The 
federal judiciary has resisted this invitati~n.~O Second, supervi- 
sory power increasingly has been recognized by federal courts 
as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of a co- 
ordinate branch of government, and its exercise a violation of 
separation of powers principles.41 Finally, once supervisory 
33. United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1983); United 
Statesv. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 885 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Proceed- 
ings, 507 F.2d 963, 964 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); United 
States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972). 
34. Offitt V. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-18 (1954). 
35. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1976); Marshall v. United States, 
360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959). 
36. Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345, 1349-51 (2d Cir. 19741, cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 947 (1975). 
37. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975); Mesarosh v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956). 
38. United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1214-17 (7th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974). 
39. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947). 
40. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973) (holding that the deci- 
sions of lower federal courts concerning law enforcement practices "introduce[ I an 
unmanageably subjective standard"); United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 
1090,1091 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The supervisory power simply does not give the courts 
the authority to make up the rules as they go, imposing limits on the executive 
according to whim or will."). 
41. Russell, 411 U.S. at 435 ("The execution of the federal laws under our Con- 
stitution is confided primarily to the Executive Branch of the Government."); 
Simpson, 927 F.2d at 1091 ("The doctrine of separation of powers requires judicial 
respect for the independence of the prosecutor."). 
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power became subservient to harmless error analysis,42 this 
power became largely irrelevant.43 
One commentator has traced the philosophical basis for su- 
pervisory power to the dissenting opinions of Justice Brandeis 
in several early entrapment ~ases.~4 Interestingly, the decline 
of supervisory power can be attributed to a more recent entrap- 
ment case, United States v. Russe11.45 There, the Supreme 
Court reinstated a drug conviction that had been reversed by 
the court of appeals for excessive governmental involvement in 
the crime.46 Undercover agents had participated in the manu- 
facture of illegal drugs by supplying an essential chemical to 
the drug ring.47 Whereas Justice Brandeis saw the judiciary as 
having a role to deny aid to governmental lawbreaking's "in or- 
der to maintain respect for law" and "to preserve the judicial 
process from contaminationYn49 Justice Rehnquist, in Russell, 
warned the federal judiciary against exercising a " 'chancellor's 
foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not ap- 
prove."50 Such judicial intervention, Rehnquist commented 
pointedly, "unnecessarily introduces an unmanageably subjec- 
tive standard," and violates the principle of separation of pow- 
ers.bl Thus, governmental investigative conduct would be 
immune from judicial supervision unless that conduct impli- 
cates an independent constitutional right, or "is so outrageous 
42. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,254-56 (1988); United 
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-12 (1983). 
43. The most recent application of supervisory power by the Supreme Court 
was Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (19871, hold- 
ing that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be 
appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order. Id. 
a t  808-09. The case dealt with a blatant conflict of interest by an attorney and did 
not address misconduct by prosecutors generally. Id. at 809-14. 
44. Beale, supra note 4, at 1443. 
45. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
46. Id. a t  436. 
47. Id. a t  425-26. 
48. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,483 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent- 
ing); see also Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423-24 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
49. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
50. Russell, 411 U.S. a t  435. 
51. Id. 
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that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern- 
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."52 
Federal supervisory power was further eroded in United 
States v. Payner,53 where the Court exempted from judicial su- 
pervision flagrant governmental illegality that actually violates 
individual rights.64 Payner involved an admittedly illegal police 
search and seizure of documents found in a third party's brief- 
case that incriminated the defendant.55 The district court, in- 
voking its supervisory power, held that society's interest in 
deterring governmental conduct that "knowingly and purpose- 
fully" and in "bad faith hostility" to the Constitution violated a 
person's rights required suppression of the resulting evidence.56 
The Supreme Court reversed.57 Under a Brandeis rational, 
sanctioning such behavior "breeds contempt for law," and "de- 
clare[~] that in the administration of the criminal law the end 
justifies the means."58 The modern Court, however, looked to 
other societal values that needed to  be accommodated, particu- 
larly the interest in presenting reliable evidence of guilt to the 
factfinder.59 Seen in this way, Payner establishes a broad limi- 
tation on supervisory power; it subordinates the interests of de- 
52. Id. a t  431-432. The Court's opinion cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165 (1952), as authority for this rule. Rochin is the seminal case illustrating the 
due process limits on law enforcement investigative tactics. In Rochin, the 
Supreme Court found that the police officers' use of a stomach pump to force two 
capsules of a narcotic drug from the defendant's stomach offended due process. Id. 
at 166, 174. The Court, in a classic opinion by Justice Frankfurter, reversed 
Rochin's state court conviction, declaring: 'This is conduct that shocks the con- 
science." Id. a t  172. In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (19761, a majority 
of the Court would allow a due process defense only in extreme cases of govern- 
mental misconduct. Id. a t  489-91. The concurring opinion of Justice Powell re- 
ferred to Judge Henry Friendly's statement that it would be "unthinkable . . . to 
permit government agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather 
evidence to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums." Id. a t  493 n.4 (Powell, 
J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 
1973)). 
53. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
54. Id. a t  734-37. 
55. Id. a t  729-30. 
56. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113,130,133-35 (N.D. Ohio 19771, 
affd per curiam, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
57. Payner, 447 U.S. at 736-37. 
58. Olmstead, 277 U.S. a t  485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
59. Payner, 447 U.S. a t  735 ("[S]upe~sory power does not authorize a federal 
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized 
u n l a h l l y  from a third party not before the court."). 
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terring illegal conduct and preserving judicial integrity to the 
interest in accurate guilt-determinations. 
This overriding interest in ensuring accurate judgments 
was reaffirmed in two subsequent supervisory power cases - 
United States v. Hasting60 and Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 
States.61 In Hasting, the Seventh Circuit reversed kidnapping 
convictions on the ground that the prosecutor's summation in- 
fringed upon the defendants' Fifth Amendment privileges, in di- 
rect violation of repeated and explicit admonitions by the circuit 
court against such misconduct.62 The court of appeals sought to 
vindicate the interests that the supervisory power doctrine his- 
torically was designed to address - deterring governmental 
overreaching and preserving judicial integrity - by refusing to 
require a finding of prejudice.63 The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that supervisory power could not be used to censure 
governmental misconduct without first determining whether 
the defendant was prejudiced by that conduct.64 Supervisory 
power, in other words, could not trump the harmless error 
rule.65 
60. 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
61. 487 U.S. 250 (1988). 
62. United States v. Hasting, 660 F.2d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1981). 
63. Id. 
64. Hasting, 461 U.S. a t  505-06,512. The "harmless-error rule . . . may not be 
avoided by an assertion of supervisory power . . . ." Id. a t  505. 
65. A federal appellate court following Hasting could not use its supervisory 
power prophylactically to reverse a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct 
unless that misconduct was suiliciently harmful that it prejudiced the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Of course, if such misconduct was harmful, there would be no 
need to invoke supervisory power in the first place, since the misconduct would 
violate the Constitution. 
Hasting, however, is not applicable in state proceedings, and some state appel- 
late courts have exercised their supervisory power to reverse convictions for 
prosecutorial misconduct that did not necessarily prejudice the defense. See State 
v. Fullwood, 484 A.2d 435,442 (Corn. 1984) ("This court, nonetheless, has supervi- 
sory power to vacate a judgment of conviction and to order a new trial to deter 
prosecutorial misconduct which, while not so egregious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, is 'unduly offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process.' ") 
(citations omitted); State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1993) (%is 
power to reverse prophylactically or in the interests of justice comes from our 
power to supervise the trial courts."). 
The more common state court approach is expressed in State v. Valdez, 770 
P.2d 313, 318 (Ariz. 1989) (Where there has been misconduct but no error, or the 
error is harmless, or when a defendant has failed to object to a nonfundamental 
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Bank of Nova Scotia paralleled Hasting, but in the context 
of a grand jury proceeding. The district court found that the 
prosecutor engaged in serious misconduct that undermined the 
grand jury's independence.66 Using its supervisory authority, 
the court dismissed the indictment.67 Further delimiting the 
scope of supervisory power, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
lower court had exceeded its power.68 The Court held that "a 
federal court may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent 
the harmless-error inquiry . . . ."69 Consistent with Hasting, the 
Court asserted that prejudice to the defendant is the linchpin 
for invoking supervisory power, and that absent such harm, no 
foul would be found.70 
Finally, and most recently, in United States v. Williams,71 
the Court ruled that supervisory power could not be invoked to 
remedy prosecutorial misconduct that involved withholding 
substantial exculpatory evidence from the grand j~ry.72 The 
error, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by ap- 
propriate sanctions against the offending actor.") (citations omitted). 
The New York courts have not used their supervisory power to reverse convic- 
tions prophylactically for prosecutorial misconduct. The courts will reverse convic- 
tions based on prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct is harmful. See 
People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 430 N.E.2d 885, 887-88, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9, 
12 (1981). However, the courts' articulation of the standard varies. See People v. 
Halm, 81 N.Y.2d 819, 821, 611 N.E.2d 281, 282, 595 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1993) 
(prosecutor's remarks were not prejudicial error); People v. DeJesus, 42 N.Y.2d 
519,369 N.E.2d 752,399 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1977) (prosecutor's remarks were prejudi- 
cial error); People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109-11, 347 N.E.2d 564, 566-68, 383 
N.Y.S.2d 204,206-208 (1976) (prosecuhr's remarks deprived defendant of right to 
fair trial); People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256,260,247 N.E.2d 651,653,299 N.Y.S.2d 
830, 833 (1969) (prosecutor's summation "clearly impropern and prejudiced jury); 
People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266, 273, 229 N.E.2d 206, 210, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519, 
523 (1967) (prosecutor's remarks exceeded fair limits of advocacy and were prejudi- 
cial to defendant as a matter of law); People v. Rosa, 108 A.D.2d 531,489 N.Y.S.2d 
722 (1st Dep't 1985) (prosecutor's egregious conduct denied defendant a fair trial). 
66. United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1328, 1331, 1336, 1339, 
1343 (D. Colo. 1984) (finding that the prosecutor had improperly deputized agents 
of the Internal Revenue Service as "agent[s] of the grand jury," flaunted secrecy 
provisions, misused grants of immunity, improperly introduced summaries of tes- 
timony, mistreated witnesses, and made inflammatory and prejudicial comments). 
67. Id. a t  1353. 
68. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. a t  255. 
69. Id. a t  254. 
70. Id. a t  255-56. 
71. 112 5. Ct. 1735 (1992). 
72. Id. a t  1745-46. The defendant was investigated by the grand jury for sup- 
plying banks with knowingly false financial statements of his current assets for 
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Court wrote: "Because the grand jury is an institution separate 
from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not pre- 
side, we think it clear that, as a general matter at least, no such 
'supervisory' judicial authority exists."73 Williams broadened 
considerably the limitation on supervisory power with respect 
to the prosecutor's grand jury conduct fashioned in Bank of 
Nova Scotia. The Court in Bank of Nova Scotia assumed that if 
the prosecutor's conduct was sufficiently prejudicial, dismissal 
of the indictment as a matter of supervisory power would be 
warranted. Williams declared that only in those "few" in- 
stances where the prosecutor's conduct is circumscribed by spe- 
cific statutes or rules do courts have any supervisory power to 
remedy misconduct.74 
111. New York's Recognition of Supervisory Power 
The proposition that a New York court possesses a power 
akin to the federal supervisory power can be traced to People ex 
rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court.75 There, an Orange County grand 
jury indicted the defendant for poisoning her husband with the 
help of an accomplice who had furnished the arsenic.76 Pro- 
vided to the defendant in advance of trial were the transcripts 
of the grand jury testimony of: 1) the accomplice who claimed to 
have provided the defendant with the poison, 2) the physicians 
who had examined the contents of the stomach, and 3) the other 
witnesses with respect to cause of death.77 Not satisfied with 
this disclosure, the defendant sought an order from the judge at 
Special Term requiring the District Attorney to disclose to the 
defense written statements made by various witnesses that 
the purpose of obtaining loans. Id. at 1737. The indictment was dismissed be- 
cause the prosecutor had withheld from the grand jury the defendant's general 
ledgers and tax returns, and defendant's testimony in a contemporaneous Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceeding, which evidence purportedly would have demonstrated 
that the defendant had not intentionally misled the banks. Id. at 1737-38. 
73. Id. a t  1742. 
74. Id. a t  1741. 
75. 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927). 
76. Id. a t  26, 156 N.E. a t  84. 
77. Id. a t  26-27, 156 N.E. a t  84. Such disclosure would not be authorized to- 
day. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 210.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994); see also In re 
Jaffe v. Scheinman, 47 N.Y.2d 188,390 N.E.2d 1165, 417 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1979). 
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remedies of discovery and inspecti0n.a These equitable reme- 
dies, however, involved a "separate" and "ancillary" lawsuit and 
were, therefore, "awkward and unwieldy."8s Accordingly, stat- 
utes were enacted as early as 1830 authorizing, to a limited ex- 
tent, discovery and inspection that the equity courts had 
created.B6 Despite this legislative "usurpation" of the judicial 
prer0gative,8~ the statutory remedies were well received and in- 
deed were expanded in successive codes of civil procedure.* 
Nevertheless, even in civil litigation, the statutory jurisdiction 
was limited.89 Documents were not subject to inspection "for 
the mere reason that they will be useful in supplying a clew 
whereby evidence can be gathered. Documents to be subject to 
inspection must be evidence themselves."gO 
Turning to criminal cases, Cardozo described an "even 
more restricted" judicial p0wer.9~ There are opinions that deny 
courts any power whatever to order discovery in criminal cases, 
Apr. 20, 1777, "would continue to be law, unless altered or repealed, and unless 
they were 'repugnant' to the constitution." Id. a t  111. 
84. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE $1484 (12th ed. 
1877): 
One of the defects in the administration of justice in the courts of common 
law arises from their want of power to compel a complete discovery of the 
material facts in controversy by the oaths of the parties in the suit. And 
hence (as we have seen), one of the most important and extensive sources of 
the jurisdiction of courts of equity is their power to compel parties, upon 
proper proceedings, to make every such discovery. 
Id. a t  728. 
85. Lemon, 245 N.Y. a t  28, 156 N.E. a t  84-85. 
86. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 199, Part 111, ch. 1, tit. 3, $5 21, 22. 
87. McQuigan, 129 N.Y. a t  55, 29 N.E. a t  236. 
88. Lemon, 245 N.Y. a t  28,156 N.E. a t  85; see Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448, 
55 342,803, 1876 (2) N.Y. Laws 1, 152 (repealed 1920); Civil Practice Act, ch. 925, 
5 324, 1920 (4) N.Y. Laws 19, 124 (repealed 1962). 
89. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 28-29; 156 N.E. at 85. 
90. Id. a t  29, 156 N.E. a t  85. 
91. Id. Cardozo has been criticized for ignoring statutory reforms in mid- 
nineteenth England that broadened a defendant's access to discovery materials. 
See Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. 
REV. 293,295 (1960). Statutes allowed defendants the right to be present a t  pre- 
liminary hearings, to cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses of their own, and 
to inspect and receive copies of depositions taken in preliminary hearings. Id. In 
addition, no witness could be called a t  trial unless he was examined at a prelimi- 
nary hearing. Id. This rule, according to Wigmore, "is required by fairness to an 
innocent accused," and "is a question of Ljudiciall policy, not of Ijudiciall power." 6 
JOHN H. WIGMORE, VIDENCE 5 1850, a t  509 (Chadboum rev. 1976). 
Heinonline - -  14 Pace L. Rev. 54 1994 
19941 SUPERVISORY POWER 55 
Cardozo observed, while other decisions appear to authorize 
discovery of documents "that are the subject of the charge."92 
Still other courts "concede or assume a broader jurisdiction, one 
adequate to prevent a failure of justice, yet narrower than dis- 
covery in equity or under the statutory substitute."93 However, 
even conceding this latter power to order discovery in further- 
ance of justice, Cardozo stated that "[nlowhere has there been a 
suggestion that the jurisdiction can properly be extended to 
notes or memoranda in the possession of the prosecutor, but 
inadmissible as evidence either for prosecution or for defense."94 
Cardozo buttressed this assertion by citing Rex v. Hol- 
land,95 as his "point of departure."96 Holland, decided by the 
King's Bench in 1792, denied a defendant charged with pecula- 
tion and corruption in East India the opportunity to inspect in 
advance of trial a report issued by a British board of inquiry 
after it had interviewed witnesses.97 This report would have 
been inadmissible in evidence for the prosecution or defense.98 
Although inspection of the report would have enabled the de- 
fendant to better prepare his case for trial, Lord Kenyon re- 
jected out of hand the discovery application: 
Nor was such a motion as the present ever made; and if we were 
to grant it, it would subvert the whole system of criminal law. . . . 
And if we were to assume a discretionary power of granting this 
request, it would be dangerous in the extreme, and totally un- 
founded on precedent.99 
Later cases allowed discovery where the document was the 
basis of the charge,lO'J or itself would have been received in evi- 
dence.101 Cardozo also alluded to two other United States' cases 
which suggested that inspection should 'be granted where "a 
92. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 29, 156 N.E. at 85. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, $2224, at 219-20 (3d ed. MC- 
Naughton rev. 1940). 
95. 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). 
96. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 29, 156 N.E. at 85 (citing Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. 
Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792)). 
97. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1250. 
98. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30, 156 N.E. at 85. 
99. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249-50. 
100. Rex v. Harrie, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (N.P. 1833). 
101. Regina v. Dorr, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 221 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1848). 
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failure of justice may result from its suppression."l02 Both cases 
involved inspection of physical evidence such as body parts, 
weapons or other exhibits in the possession of the prosecutor.lo3 
Cardozo thus recognized a "kinship* between the power to com- 
pel inspection "in furtherance of justicen and the "assumption of 
a supervisory jurisdiction over the acts of public prosecutors.*l04 
However, Cardozo noted that there is a danger in reading too 
much into this "furtherance of justice" concept, particularly 
when it encroaches upon the power of a coordinate branch of 
government.lO5 Distinguishable, Cardozo observed, are cases 
that suggest an inherent judicial power to permit inspection of 
grand jury minutes, or to compel the service of a bill of 
particulars. lo6 
These decisions reflect remedial devices worked out at com- 
mon law to correct uncertainties in pleadings; they have no re- 
lation to the power to compel the prosecutor to disclose his 
proof.107 The latter common law power derives from the activi- 
ties of the Chancellor, "who was careful, none the less, with all 
his injunctions and discoveries, to hold aloof from interference 
with prosecutions by the Crown."los Cardozo further stated: 
"The s u p e ~ s o r y  control, whatever it may be, that belongs to 
courts of common law in respect of a criminal prosecution, is an 
autochthonous growth, a thing evolving from within. It was not 
102. Lemon, 245 N.Y. a t  30, 156 N.E. a t  85 (citing People v. Gerold, 107 N.E. 
165 (Ill. 1914) and Commonwealth v. Jordan, 93 N.E. 809 (Mass.), affd, 225 U.S. 
167 (1911)). 
103. Id. 
104. Lemon, 245 N.Y. a t  30-31, 156 N.E. a t  85-86 (citing Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). In Weeks, the Supreme Court fashioned an exclusion- 
ary remedy for violations of the fourth amendment committed by federal law en- 
forcement officers. Weeks, 232 U.S. a t  398. Cardozo may have believed that the 
exclusionary rule announced in Weeks was an exercise of supervisory authority. In 
a later decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the exclusionary rule of Weeks was 
constitutionally-based. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). 
105. Lemon, 245 N.Y. a t  31,156 N.E. a t  86. Cardozo was probably expressing 
the restrictive American view of judicial power, which holds that our judges do not 
exercise a power traditionally exercised by English judges of constraining the exec- 
utive branch by common law rules, subject to the ultimate authority of the legisla- 
ture. As Professor Hill notes, "Ultimate authority here resides in written 
constitutions, which are thought to have settled the prerogatives of the several 
branches of the government." Hill, supra note 4, at 208. 
106. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30, 156 N.E. a t  85. 
107. Id. a t  30, 156 N.E. at 85. 
108. Id. at 31-32, 156 N.E. at 86. 
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forced upon them from without under pressure of the Chan- 
cery."l09 Cardozo concluded his discussion of supervisory power 
with the passage quoted in the introduction.110 Needless to say, 
the court affirmed the order of prohibition.111 
IV. Inherent Judicial Power 
As the preceding discussion suggests, supervisory power 
can be understood as an attribute of a much broader inherent 
judicial power. Defining or categorizing this inherent power 
has posed for the courts a "vexing problem."112 Inherent power 
finds expression in a variety of areas in which the courts histor- 
ically have exercised an authority not derived from any written 
text, such as a constitution or a statute.l13 These areas have 
included the power to regulate the practice of law,ll* deal with 
matters of court budget,ll5 administer courtroom facilities and 
109. Id. a t  32, 156 N.E. a t  86. 
110. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
111. Lemon, 245 N.Y. a t  35, 156 N.E. a t  87. 
112. In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445,450,539 N.E.2d 565, 568,541 
N.Y.S.2d 737,740 (1989); see also Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445,451,489 
N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 (2d Dep't 1985) ("[Tlhe inherent power, is, by its very nature, 
not susceptible to precise definition.") Historically, inherent power resides only in 
New York courts of superior jurisdiction, i.e., courts of record, and not in inferior 
courts. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d at 448 n.l,489 N.Y.S.2d a t  918 n.1. The State Con- 
stitution specifically enumerates the courts of record, and authorizes the creation 
of "such other courts as the legislature may determine shall be courts of record." 
N.Y. CONST. art. 6,5 l(b); see N.Y. J m .  LAW Q 2 (McKinney 1994) (courts of record 
are the court for the trial of impeachments, the court on the judiciary, the court of 
appeals, the appellate division of the supreme court, the supreme court, the court 
of claims, the county court, the family court, the surrogate's court, the city courts, 
the district courts, and the civil and criminal courts of New York City). 
113. See sources cited i n h  notes 114-22. 
114. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991); In re Greene, 54 
N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981); In re Bar Assoc. of New 
York, 222 A.D. 580,227 N.Y.S. 1 (1st Dep't 1928); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, ODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS Q 2.2.1 (1986); Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts 
to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525 
(1983). But see A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 
681, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986) (court has no inherent power to impose monetary 
sanctions against attorney for frivilous litigation). 
115. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A2d 193 (Pa.), cert. &- 
nied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of 
Inherent Power, 14 PACE L. REV. 111 (1994); Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy 
and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL . REV. 975 (1972). 
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personnel,ll6 control court records and files,"' calendar cases 
and dismiss actions for nonprosecution,~~* and establish sub- 
stantive,llg evidentiary,l20 and procedural121 rules to resolve dis- 
116. See State v. Davis, 68 P. 689 (Nev. 1902); In re Spike, 99 Misc. 2d 178, 
415 N.Y.S.2d 762 mates County Ct. 1979); In re People v. Little, 89 Misc. 2d 742, 
392 N.Y.S.2d 831 mates County Ct.), a r d ,  60 A.D.2d 797,400 N.Y.S.2d 615 (4th 
Dep't 1977); In re Courtroom & Offices of Fifth Branch Circuit Court, 134 N.W. 490 
(Wis. 1912); Henry M. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 
635 (1935). 
117. See Nixon v. Warner Communication, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); In re 
Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182,480 N.E.2d 378,490 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1985); In re 
Campbell v. Pesce, 60 N.Y.2d 165,456 N.E.2d 806,468 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983); Doro- 
thy D. v. New York City Prob. Dep't, 49 N.Y.2d 212,400 N.E.2d 1342,424 N.Y.S.2d 
890 (1980); People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Orange County Court, 271 N.Y. 151, 2 
N.E.2d 521 (1936); People ex rel. Doe v. Beaudoin, 102 A.D.2d 359,478 N.Y.S.2d 84 
(3d Dep't 1984). 
118. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Grisi v. Shainswit, 119 
A.D.2d 418,507 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1st Dep't 1986); Plachte v. Bancroft, 3 A.D.2d 437, 
161 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1st Dep't 1957). But see In re Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 
564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988); Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 
N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690,303 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1969). 
119. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 
(1957) (Fuld, J.): 
The rule of nonliability is out of tune with the Life about us, a t  variance with 
modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing. It should be 
discarded. To the suggestion that stare &cisis compels us to perpetuate it 
until the legislature acts, a ready answer is at hand. It was intended, not to 
effect a "petrifying rigidity," but to assure the justice that flows from cer- 
tainty and stability. If, instead, adherence to precedent offers not justice but 
unfairness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its right to sur- 
vive, and no principle constrains us to follow it. 
Id.; see also Hymowitz v. Lilly Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 507,539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075, 541 
N.Y.S.2d 941, 947 (1989) ("[Tlhe ever-evolving dictates of justice and fairness, 
which are a t  the heart of our common-law system, require formulation of a remedy 
for injuries caused by DES."). 
120. Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 341, 200 N.E.2d 550, 554, 251 
N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (1964) (Fuld, J., concurring): 
The common law of evidence is constantly being refashioned by the courts of 
this and other jurisdictions to meet the demands of modem litigation . . . 
Absent some strong public policy or a clear act of pre-emption by the Legis- 
lature, rules of evidence should be fashioned to further, not Frustrate, the 
truth-finding functions of the courts in civil cases. 
Id.; see In re Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183, 325 N.E.2d 533, 366 N.Y.S.2d 116 
(1975) (allowing unsworn testimony to be received in administrative proceedings). 
121. Riglander v. Star Co., 98 A.D. 101, 104-05, 90 N.Y.S. 772, 774-75 (1st 
Dep't 19041, afd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905): 
One of the powers which has always been recognized as inherent in courts, 
which are protected in their existence, their powers and jurisdiction by con- 
stitutional provisions, has been the right to control its order of business and 
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putes between parties.122 This latter aspect of inherent power 
is immediately recognizable as the dominant feature of the 
traditional common lawmaking process, where courts in the 
context of a case or controversy, mold, mod@, or discard rules 
found to be unsatisfactory, or promulgate new rules when 
deemed ne~essary .1~~ The formulation of substantive, proce- 
dural, and remedial rules is a familiar, and treacherous, judicial 
function.124 The process is interpretive, interstitial, and incre- 
mental. It is admittedly "legislative,*~2~ but its operation pur- 
to so conduct the same that the rights of all suitors before them may be 
safeguarded. This power has been recognized as judicial in its nature, and 
as being a necessary appendage to a court organized to enforce rights and 
redress wrongs . . . The courts are not the puppet. of the Legislature. They 
are an independent branch of the government, as necessary and powerful in 
their sphere as either of the other great divisions. And while the Legislature 
has the power to alter and regulate the proceedings in law and equity, it can 
only exercise such power in that respect as it has heretofore exercised; and it 
has never before attempted to deprive the courts of that judicial discretion 
which they have always been accustomed to exercise. 
Id. 
122. See, e.g., Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 A.D. 504, 196 N.Y.S. 43 (1st Dep't 1922), 
affd, 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1923); Riglander v. Star Co., 98 A.D. 101, 90 
N.Y.S. 772 (1st Dep't 1904), afd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905); Roscoe 
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599 (1926); Tyrrell Wil- 
liams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Mecting Procedure, 22 WASH. 
L.Q. 459 (1937). 
123. The early New York courts, in the absence of a state constitutional Bill of 
Rights, employed the common law to protect individual rights. See, e.g., People v. 
Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187,201 (1820) ("the principle [double jeopardy] is a sound and 
fundamental one of the common law"). The nature and extent of judicial lawmak- 
ing power is one of the classic subjects of legal philosophy. See generally G. CALA- 
BRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); CARDOZO, supm note 1; 
Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1965); Sol Wachtler, 
Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
124. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 533-34 (1898): 
But even without legislation, the judges have great power over the subject, 
direct as well as indirect. A system which mainly came into life a t  their 
hands and has been constantly moulded by them, by way of administering 
procedure, they can also largely reshape and recast, if they will. But no 
court should enter upon this task that is not sure of its ground, that does not 
pretty well understand the history, nature, and scope of the existing rules, 
and see pretty clearly where it means to come out. 
Id. 
125. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dis- 
senting) ("I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but 
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular 
motions."). 
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portedly is circumscribed by "consecrated principles."l26 The 
relationship between judicial and legislative power is a timeless 
topic of legal discourse, and a central theme of s u p e ~ s o r y  
p0wer.1~~ 
It is in relation to this aspect of inherent judicial power - 
the common law adjudicative process - that supervisory power 
can be understood as an independent doctrine.128 As the federal 
126. CARDOZO, supra note 1, a t  141. 
127. Cardozo described that relationship as "conflictedn rather than 
cooperative: 
Today courts and legislatures work in separation and aloofness. The pen- 
alty is paid both in the wasted effort of production and in the lowered qual- 
ity of the product. On the one side, the judges, left to fight against 
anachronism and injustice by the methods of judge-made law, are distracted 
by the conflicting promptings of justice and logic, of consistency and mercy, 
and the output of their labors bears the tokens of the strain. On the other 
side, the legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs 
and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or 
systematic advice as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the 
fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend. Legislature and 
courts move on in proud and silent isolation. Some agency must be found to 
mediate between them. 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1921). 
For a much more recent commentary describing the tension over whether evi- 
dence rules should be created by judges or legislators, see Barbara C. Salken, To 
Codifi or Not to Codifi - That is the Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to 
Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641 (1992). 
Since 1881, when the New York State Legislature codified criminal procedure, 
there has never been any serious movement to abolish or control legislative power 
over criminal procedure. See The Rule-Making Power in New York, F I ~  ANN. 
REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 271,275 (1939). However, there have been serious efforts 
to amend Article VI of the state constitution to limit in civil cases the legislature's 
authority "to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and equity 
that it has heretofore exercised." Id. Although the legislature possesses the con- 
stitutional authority to regulate civil procedure, the legislature is constitutionally 
empowered to delegate authority to the courts to regulate practice and procedure. 
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, 8 30. An example of such delegation is contained in N.Y. JUD. 
LAW 5 85 (McKinney 1994) (delegation of rule-making powers to appellate 
divisions). 
128. I t  is important to distinguish between inherent power as part of the com- 
mon law adjudicative process, and inherent power to regulate court-related mat- 
ters apart from the merits of the lawsuit. The exercise of inherent power in the 
latter situation raises concerns similar to the exercise of s u p e ~ s o r y  power. Thus, 
New York courts have invoked inherent power to protect the integrity of judg- 
ments. See In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445,539 N.E.2d 565,541 N.Y.S.2d 
737 (1989); In re Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182,480 N.E.2d 378, 490 N.Y.S.2d 
764 (1985);,People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 473 N.E.2d 6, 483 N.Y.S.2d 654 
(1984). The New York courts have also invoked inherent power to protect the dig- 
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cases suggest,129 supervisory power ordinarily is exercised when 
there are gaps in the law130 - when neither constitutional, 
statutory, nor common law rules exist to cover the particular 
case - and where some compelling reason, typically expressed 
as justice, fairness, social welfare, or public policy also exists to 
persuade the judge to decide the case accordingly. 
To be sure, policy considerations animate every judge, and, 
in that regard, supervisory power may be no less subjective 
than the common law process generally. However, when invok- 
ing supervisory power, the judge's authority does not rest upon 
any statute or other written declaration of popular will. Nor is 
nity of the court. See In re Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564,523 N.E.2d 297, 
528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988); People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194,456 N.E.2d 1179, 469 
N.Y.S.2d 56 (1983); People v. Wingard, 33 N.Y.2d 192, 306 N.E.2d 402, 351 
N.Y.S.2d 385 (1973) (dismissal of information as matter of discretion when neither 
prosecutor nor police officer opened for trial). 
As with supervisory power, these cases are themselves controversial because 
they offer scant analysis and produce few guiding principles. Thus, New York 
courts have no inherent power to dismiss an indictment where the prosecutor re- 
fuses or is unable to proceed despite admonitions from the court, In re Holtzman v. 
Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (19881, to set aside a 
verdict of guilty following a bench trial, People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 473 
N.E.2d 6, 483 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1984), or to vacate after sentence a guilty plea to 
correct a mutual mistake by.all parties, In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445, 
539 N.E.2d 565, 541 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1989). 
Despite the absence of a statute directly covering the matter, courts in such 
cases are found to be exercising a power not specifically conferred by the legisla- 
ture, acting in an extra-judicial capacity after the case has been terminated, or 
usurping the power of a coequal branch of government. In essence, it is regarded 
as bad public policy to allow the inferior courts to exercise the foregoing inherent 
powers. See In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445, 539 N.E.2d 565, 541 
N.Y.S.2d 737 (1989); In re Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 480 N.E.2d 378, 490 
N.Y.S.2d 764 (1985); People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530,473 N.E.2d 6,483 N.Y.S.2d 
483 (1984). 
129. See cases cited supra notes 31-38. 
130. Judicial power to fill legislative gaps is viewed either as a form of statu- 
tory interpretation or common lawmaking. See CARWZO, supra note 1, a t  70 ("In 
every case, without exception, it is the business of the court to supply what the 
statute omits, but always by means of an interpretive function."); Cass R. Sun- 
stein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 IIARv. L. REV. 405,421-22 
(1989) (gap-filling is neither an embarrassment nor a usurpation but an inevitable 
part of interpretation); see also Daniel R. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the 
Supreme Court, 47 U .  MWI L. REV. 375 (1992) (discussing the various and occa- 
sionally inconsistent approaches of the Supreme Court to gap-filling). The 
Supreme Court has expressed a general reluctance to draw inferences from Con- 
gressional silence, and fills statutory gaps based on doctrinal and policy considera- 
tions. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). 
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the judge functioning in a distinctly interpretative mode, which 
routinely occurs when the judge finds that a positive rule covers 
the subject, and then proceeds to define and apply the rule. The 
judge who invokes supervisory power is creating a new rule 
based on considerations of justice, fundamental fairness, and 
civilized standards of decency.131 
Although the common law approach also may involve fash- 
ioning a new rule, either procedural, evidentiary, or substan- 
tive,132 the rule is formulated in the context of adjudicating the 
rights of the parties before the court and enables the court to 
decide that discrete controversy. For example, judges have for- 
mulated procedural rules governing the examination of wit- 
nessesl33 and the taking of guilty pleas;l34 evidentiary rules 
creating hearsay exceptions135 and testimonial privileges;l36 and 
substantive rules expanding tort liability.137 Supervisory 
power, by contrast, typically has been invoked in situations that 
131. Inferior courts that invoke supervisory power are creating a rule for that 
particular case. Superior courts, such as the New York Court of Appeals, are for- 
mulating a rule for general application by inferior courts to all similar cases. The 
term "supervisory power" is therefore more apt when referring to the rulings of 
superior courts. 
132. See supm notes 119-21. 
133. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 314 N.E.2d 413, 418, 357 
N.Y.S.2d 849, 856 (1974) (stating that a court ruling should be guided by "its dis- 
cretion and in the interests of justice," and should be informed by "the vitality and 
sagacity of the common law process"). 
134. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227,243,318 N.E.2d 784,795,360 N.Y.S.2d 
623, 638 (1974) (emphasizing the "role of the court in overseeing and supervising 
the delicate balancing of public and private interests in the process of plea 
bargaining"). 
135. People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610. N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696 
(1993); Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647 
(1964). But see Loschiavo v. Port Authority, 58 N.Y.2d 1040,448 N.E.2d 1351,462 
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983) (refusing to change "well-settled, albeit. widely criticized" 
hearsay rule dealing with an agent's admissions and .deferring such change to 
legislature). 
136. People v. Ramistella, 306 N.Y. 379, 118 N.E. 566 (1954); People ex rel. 
Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291,199 N.E. 415 (1936); Bacon v. 
Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394 (1880). 
137. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). 
There is no similar common law power with respect to criminal liability. See Peo- 
ple v. Fein, 292 N.Y. 10,14,53 N.E.2d 374,376 (1944) ("Long ago in this State '. . . 
the abolition of all common-law crimes was accomplished . . . .' No act committed 
within this jurisdiction is criminal except as prescribed by statute.") (citations 
omitted). 
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are independent of the actual controversy, such as pre-trial dis- 
covery,l38 grand jury proceedings,139 and police investigations.140 
To be sure, judicial review of such matters may have proce- 
dural and evidentiary consequences that can affect the ultimate 
disposition of the case. However, the impact of such review 
transcends the actual controversy, and imposes behavioral 
norms on a coordinate branch of government, in addition to di- 
rectly affecting the rights of the litigants before the court. 
Moreover, whereas a principal purpose of the common law pro- 
cess is to resolve the dispute between the private litigants,l41 
the dominant purpose of supervisory power is to formulate stan- 
dards of proper conduct for public officials, typically prosecu- 
tors, police, and other law enforcement personnel.142 Thus, as 
Professor Hill observed, judges who exercise supervisory power 
"seem to regard the conferring of public benefit as incidental to 
withholding judicial favor or protecting the judiciary from unsa- 
vory involvement."~43 
138. See infin notes 145-222 and accompanying text. 
139. See infia notes 223-336 and accompanying text. 
140. See infFa notes 337-91 and accompanying text. 
141. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46,97 (1907) ("For after all, the com- 
mon law is but the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in 
their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individuals in respect to 
private disputes."). 
Chancellor James Kent described the common law as "those principles, us- 
ages, and rules of action, applicable to the government and security of persons and 
property, which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive decla- 
ration of the will of the legislature." 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 470 (4th ed. 1840). 
There are two principal functions of the judicial decision. The f i s t  function is 
to decide the private controversy. The second function is to declare the law for 
future controversies. These functions have a reciprocal influence that recall the 
saying that "hard cases make bad law." See Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial 
Decision, 3 6 . m ~ .  L  REV. 940,940 (1.923). When exercising s u p e ~ s o r y  power, a 
judge presumably is aware of this conflict, but, as a matter of justice and sound 
public policy, has decided that the function of deciding the particular case is out- 
weighed by the function of articulating standards'of proper governmental conduct 
for the future. 
142. The concept of supervisory power assumes that the court has a special 
responsibility when one of the parties is the government. The types of harm that 
government can inflict on private citizens is different from the types of harm that 
private citizens can inflict on one another, and thus occasions the need for special 
prophylactic measures, which is the essence of supervisory power. See Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,408-09 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
143. Hill, supra note 4, at 207-08. 
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V. Application of Supervisory Power in New York 
Based on notions of fundamental fairness and justice, and 
in the absence of any constitutional or statutory mandate, the 
New York courts have resorted to supervisory power in a vari- 
ety of contexts. The three principal areas in which supervisory 
power has been employed involve (1) formulating rules of dis- 
covery and inspection; (2) circumscribing prosecutorial conduct 
in the grand jury; and (3) fashioning remedies for governmental 
misconduct. 
A. Formulating Rules of Discovery 
Discovery is an appropriate subject for judicial supervision. 
To the extent that our adversary system is capable of providing 
an effective mechanism for arriving at  the truth about a contro- 
versy, it presupposes the ability of each party to the dispute to 
have access to information relevant to the case.145 However, be- 
cause of its inherently contentious character, the adversary sys- 
tem often resembles a game of "blind man's blufY"46 rather than 
a disinterested search for the truth.147 TO function rationally 
and fairly in the face of built-in obstacles to truth,l48 the adver- 
sary system requires the intervention of an impartial arbiter to 
oversee the process by which the parties attempt to obtain, con- 
trol, or withhold information relevant to the case. The problems 
of information acquisition and retention can become particu- 
larly troublesome in criminal litigation, where the prosecutor, 
because of his institutional role in the data-gathering process, 
has far greater access to information than the defendant, as 
144. Other instances of the exercise of supervisory power include, inter alia, 
punishment for contempt, In re Douglas v. Adel, 269 N.Y. 144,199 N.E. 35 (19351, 
closure of the courtl-oom, People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E. 769 (19541, and 
protecting jurors from pretrial publicity, People v. Mordino, 58 A.D.2d 197, 396 
N.Y.S.2d 737 (4th Dep't 1977). 
145. Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 228 (1964). 
146. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
147. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sport- 
ing Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279. 
148. These obstacles include limited defense resources, statutory and doctri- 
nal rules that restrict a defendant's ability to acquire relevant information about 
the case, and prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the defense. See 
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PIIT. L. REV. 393, 449-50 
(1992). 
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well as the ability and incentive to withhold evidence capable of 
proving a defendant's inn0~ence.l~~ Moreover, criminal discov- 
ery has never favored defendants. The traditional resistance to 
providing discovery to an accused stems from a fear that it 
would create for the accused an unfair advantage, since the 
prosecutor could not similarly compel production from the de- 
fendant,1s0 as well as a concern that a defendant would misuse 
discovery by tampering with witnesses or suborning perjury.151 
Despite strong resistance, however, criminal discovery has 
been marked by a liberalizing trend over the past half century. 
Constitutional152 and statutory153 rules of discovery and disclo- 
sure have made substantial inroads into the limited opportuni- 
ties for criminal discovery that existed at  common law.154 
Nevertheless, gaps in the discovery process remain. There 
often exists no constitutional or statutory rule to cover these 
"gaps," but a compelling argument can be made that nondisclo- 
sure will substantially affect, and possibly even distort, the ac- 
curacy and fairness of the truth-finding process.155 It is in these 
149. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 550 (1987). 
150. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE Q 2224, a t  219-20 (McNaughton Rev. 1940). 
151. See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1953): 
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that . . . the 
criminal defendant who is informed of the names of all the State's witnesses 
may take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving pe jured testimony or 
into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to testify. Moreover, 
many witnesses, if they know that the defendant will have knowledge of 
their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come forward with informa- 
tion during the investigation of the crime. 
Id. at 884 (Vanderbilt, C.J.); see also Edward S. Dennis, Jr., The Discovery Process 
in Criminal Prosecutions: Toward Fair Trials and Just Verdicts, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 
63 (1990). 
152. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (holding that compul- 
sory process clause guarantees defendant right to summon witnesses); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (stating that due process clause requires prosecutor 
to disclose exculpatory evidence). 
153. See, e.g., FED. R. C R ~ .  P  16; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW Q 240.20 (McKinney 
1993). 
154. See People ez rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 
(1927). 
155. See, e.g., Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) (documenting that 350 inno- 
cent persons were convicted of capital murders, that 23 of those persons were exe- 
cuted with 22 narrowly winning reprieves, and that a significant number of these 
cases involved claims of prosecutorial suppression of evidence); see also Bennett L. 
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situations that the New York courts, through their supervisory 
power, have formulated rules of discovery based on principles of 
"fundamental fairnessn156 and "a right sense of justice."l57 
1. "A Right Sense of Justice" 
As noted above, Lemon recognized an inherent supervisory 
power in New York courts to fashion rules of discovery in crimi- 
nal cases.158 The scope of this power, and the circumstances of 
its use, were not identified by the Lemon court. However, Judge 
Cardozo's tacit invitation to the judiciary to exercise supervi- 
sory power was explicitly accepted by the court six years later in 
People v. Walsh.159 There, a prosecution witness in a murder 
case testified that he had been interviewed and had given a 
statement to the District Attorney.160 Defense counsel re- 
quested the court to compel the prosecutor to produce the state- 
ment for use in cross-examination of the witness.lG1 The trial 
court denied defense counsel's request on the ground that no 
rule required production.162 
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that in some cir- 
cumstances, fairness to  the accused,l63 and "a right sense of jus- 
- - - - - - -- - --- 
Gershman, The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?, 9 PACE 
L. REV. 257 (1989) (discussing a film maker's graphic portrayal of the distorting 
effects of prosecutorial misconduct on the fact-finding process in a capital murder 
case). 
156. See N.Y. C u .  PROC. LAW Q 240.10 commentary a t  216 (McKinney 1993). 
157. People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883 213 N.Y.S.2d 
448, 450 (1961). 
158. Lemon, 245 N.Y. a t  32,156 N.E. a t  86; see supm notes 75-111 and accom- 
panying text. 
159. 262 N.Y. 140,186 N.E. 422 (1933). 
160. Id. a t  149, 186 N.E. at 425. 
161. Id. Plainly, the context was different than in Lemon; the request for the 
statement was made during the trial after the witness had testified, rather than 
pretrial, where no particular exigency would have supported disclosure. I t  thus 
could not be argued with the same force as in Lemon that the defense attorney was 
embarking on a general fishing expedition rather than seeking documents that, 
through impeachment by showing inconsistencies, could materially assist the fact- 
finder in determining the witness's credibility and thereby produce a more just 
result. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
162. Walsh, 262 N.Y. a t  149, 186 N.E. a t  425. 
163. Id. a t  150,186 N.E. a t  425. T h e  State has no interest in interposing any 
obstacle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused 
parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons." Id. (quoting People v. Davis, 
18 N.W. 362, 363 (Mich. 1884)). 
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tice,"1G4 require disclosure of such statements. The court thus 
created a new rule of discovery: "[Wlhere a witness in a criminal 
case testifies to having made such a statement, and the state- 
ment is in court and an inspection of it by the presiding judge 
reveals contradictory matter, its use for cross-examination on 
the question of credibility may and usually should be permit- 
ted."l65 The court qualified this holding by conceding to the 
prosecutor a limited privilege; where judicial inspection deter- 
mines that publication would be "prejudicial to the public inter- 
est," the statement is protected, and disclosure is 
unauthorized.166 
The Walsh rule, an early instance of the use of supervisory 
power, purported to strike a balance between according fairness 
to an accused and protecting the interests of the prosecutor in 
having to divulge confidential material. The rule represented a 
compromise between the principal goal of supervisory power to 
"further[ I . . . justice,"l67 and a recognition, understood by. the 
Chancellor and the common law courts, that invoking supervi- 
sory power represents a breach in the doctrine of separation of 
powers, through judicial intervention into the traditional pre- 
rogatives of the prosecutor to withhold confidential documents 
from disclosure.168 
Although broadening a defendant's access to relevant infor- 
mation, the Walsh rule may be seen as an uneasy accommoda- 
tion between promoting justice and usurping power for several 
reasons: it disallows inspection unless the judge concludes that 
a contradiction appears between the witness's testimony and 
the prior statement; it disallows inspection if the prosecutor can 
make a sufficient showing of the need for confidentiality; and it 
offers a confusing standard to the lower courts as to whether 
disclosure is mandated unless the prosecutor can establish 
either "strong reasons otherwise,"l69 or nondisclosure is re- 
quired unless the defendant can establish that the statement is 
- - -- - 
164. Walsh, 262 N.Y. at 150, 186 N.E. at 425. 
165. Id. at 149-50, 186 N.E. at 425. 
166. Id. at 150, 186 N.E. at 425. 
167. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30-31, 156 N.E. at 85-86. 
168. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
169. Walsh, 262 N.Y. at 150, 186 N.E. at 425. 
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"favorable to the defendant" and that "a right sense of justice 
demands that it should be available."l70 
In any event, despite the absence of legislation, and in a 
context that historically resisted the intervention of common 
law, the Court of Appeals in Walsh invoked its supervisory 
power to produce a rule that represented an important innova- 
tion towards more equitable criminal discovery and, ultimately, 
a fairer trial. Nonetheless, the decision was apparently a lim- 
ited one, and in the general context of criminal discovery, seem- 
ingly an isolated deviation.171 Indeed, it is difficult to find over 
the next several decades any further enunciation of the New 
York courts' reliance on supervisory power to  formulate addi- 
tional rules of discovery and inspection. Nevertheless, the New 
York courts were presumably aware of important changes tak- 
ing place in discovery doctrine, both in the federal system and 
in the rules of sister states.172 
Most significantly, in a landmark case involving the exer- 
cise of its supervisory power, the Supreme Court, in Jencks v. 
United States,l73 held that a defendant is entitled to inspect gov- 
ernment reports of interviews with witnesses without any need 
to establish a preliminary showing that the witness's testimony 
is a t  variance with prior statements given to  law enforce- 
ment.174 The Court declared: "Justice requires no less."l75 It 
reasoned: 
170. Id. 
171. See sources cited i n h  note 172. 
172. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was passed in 1946, 
allowing a defendant, upon a showing of materiality, to inspect a broad array of 
documents in the government's possession. See JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FED- 
ERAL PRACTICE RULES, a t  200-01 (1989). Many state court judges, in the exercise of 
their discretion, were allowing broad pretrial discovery. See generally Fletcher, 
supra note 91. Examples of such instances were: allowing defendants to inspect 
confessions previously given to the police, Powell v. Superior Court, 312 P.2d 698 
(Cal. 1957), allowing defendants to inspect physical evidence, such as clothing 
taken from the victim, DiJoseph Petition, 145 k 2 d  187 (Pa. 1958), or weapons or 
bullet fragments, State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 275 P.2d 887 (Ariz. 
1954), allowing defendants to analyze bloodstains or perform other scientific tests 
upon physical evidence in the hands of the police or prosecutor, State ex rel. Sadler 
v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), and allowing defendants to ob- 
tain copies of reports of scientific analyses prepared by law enforcement, Walker v. 
Superior Court, 317 P.2d 130 (Cal. App. 1957). 
173. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
174. Jencks. 353 U.S. a t  666. 
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The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government 
which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice 
is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution 
and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the ac- 
cused of anything which might be material to his defense . . . 
2. "Rosario" Rule and Judicial Expansion of Discovery 
The new rule fashioned by the Supreme Court in Jencks 
was quickly codified by Congress;l77 its impact on New York's 
criminal procedure was dramatic. The so-called "Jencks rule" 
was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in 1961 in its 
own landmark decision, People v. Rosario.178 The court held 
that "a right sense of justice" requires a prosecutor to deliver to 
the defense "forthwith" any prior statements of a witness that 
relate to the subject matter of the witness's testimony.179 Dis- 
carding the Walsh rule, the court pointed out that contradic- 
tions that can be used to discredit a witness "are certainly not 
as apparent to the impartial presiding judge as to single- 
175. Id. a t  669. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan elaborated upon the 
truth-finding interests that are served by allowing defense counsel unimpeded ac- 
cess to a witness's prior statements for whatever impeachment value the attorney 
deems appropriate: 
Every experienced trial judge and lawyer knows the value for impeaching 
purposes of statements of the witness recording the events before time dulls 
treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony 
and the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of 
inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related a t  the trial, or 
a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treat- 
ment, are also relevant to the crossexamining process of testing the credi- 
bility of a witness' trial testimony. 
Id. a t  667. The Court "disapproved" of the practice, sanctioned by cases such as 
Walsh, of directing the trial judge to inspect the documents in advance to deter- 
mine variance, relevancy, and materiality. Id. at 669. 
The Court acknowledged the prosecution's legitimate interest in safeguarding 
the privacy of its files, particularly when the documents were obtained in confi- 
dence. Id. a t  670. However, citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (19531, a 
case in which the government also resisted disclosure by relying on the so-called 
military secrets privilege, the Court firmly stated that "the Government can in- 
voke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free." 
Jencks, 353 U.S. a t  671 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12). 
176. Id. 
177. 18 U.S.C. 5 3500 (1988). 
178. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881,213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961). 
179. Id. a t  289, 173 N.E.2d a t  883,213 N.Y.S.2d a t  450. 
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minded counsel for the accused . . . ."la0 The court did not artic- 
ulate the source of its power, nor did it refer to  Cardozo's theory 
of an inherent judicial power to supervise criminal 
prosecutions.181 
The court's failure to explain the source of its authority to 
formulate a rule of criminal discovery highlights the difficulty a 
court faces, both doctrinally and prudentially, when it goes be- 
yond the conventional parameters of judicial review.182 Perhaps 
the court simply assumed that it was functioning in the tradi- 
tional common law mode and merely revising its prior Walsh 
rule. Perhaps the issue of the court's jurisdiction either never 
occurred to the litigants or the court, or did not seem especially 
important. Or perhaps the court simply decided to  obscure the 
issue of judicial power in the shadowy rhetoric of justice and 
public policy. 
To be sure, the .court did acknowledge that its ruling "turns 
largely on policy considerations" and "a right sense of justice."l83 
The court also elaborated on the policy considerations, thereby 
seeking to demonstrate that its rule was not an aberrant exer- 
cise of power but a sound innovation to ensure fair trials.184 
180. Id. a t  290, 173 N.E.2d a t  883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451. 
181. See supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text. 
182. Similar doctrinal and prudential concerns are currently dividing the 
Court of Appeals as  it attempts to formulate appropriate standards for determin- 
ing when to invoke the State Constitution to provide greater protection of individ- 
ual rights than those provided by the United States Constitution. Compare People 
v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474,503,593 N.E.2d 1328,1346,583 N.Y.S.2d 920,938 (1992) 
(Kaye, J., concurring) ("Perhaps more than any other issue, the State constitu- 
tional law cases over the past decade have seemed to fracture the Court.") with id. 
at 515,593 N.E.2d a t  1354,583 N.Y.S.2d a t  946 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (deplor- 
ing "calamitous consequences in economics and crimes which will be visited on 
New York because of the Court's indifference to the jurisprudential and practical 
benefits of Federal and State uniformity."). Additionally, compare Judith S. Kaye, 
Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399 (1987) 
(advocating state independence in constitutional decision making) with James A. 
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
763 (1992) (arguing that state constitutional law is a "vast wasteland of confusing, 
conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements"). 
183. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d a t  289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d a t  450. 
184. Id. at 289, 173 N.E.2d a t  883, 213 N.Y.S.2d a t  450. The court observed 
that pretrial statements are valuable not merely as a source of contradictions, but 
are useful to demonstrate the witness' bias, or provide the defense with other infor- 
mation to neutralize damaging testimony, stating: "Shades of meaning, stress, ad- 
ditions or omissions may be found which will place the witness' answers upon 
direct examination in an entirely different light." Id. 
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However, as an instance of the use of supervisory power to fur- 
ther justice, the court did not attempt to explain how the "right 
sense of justicen espoused by Walsh several years earlier could 
be reconciled with the more expansive "right sense of justicen 
announced in Rosario.185 
In subsequent decisions, the court attempted to elaborate 
on the rationale for the Rosario rule. In People v. Jackson,186 
the court implied, but never stated as explicitly as Justice 
Frankfurter had for the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United 
States,l8' that it has the power to incorporate its notions of jus- 
tice and fundamental fairness into a formal rule of procedure or 
evidence.lg8 The court declared that Rosario "is not based on 
the Federal or State Constitution. It is, in essence, a discovery 
rule, based on a deeply held belief that simple fairness requires 
the defendant to  be supplied with prosecution reports and state- 
ments that could conceivably aid in the defense's cross-exami- 
nation of prosecution witnesses.n18g 
Rosario was followed by several cases in which the New 
York courts, on an ad hoc basis, broadly extended criminal dis- 
covery. Some of these rulings were expressly based on the 
courts' exercise of discretion;lgO others were grounded on the 
185. Id. The court probably could have done so. It could have explained that 
times had changed, and that the concept of justice evolves; that criminal discovery 
had expanded nationally, and in some contexts even been constitutionalized; that 
defense counsel could be trusted to use the information responsibly and not to em- 
bark on fishing expeditions; that prosecutors had become more adept at concealing 
exculpatory material or increasingly engaging in systematic efforts to thwart the 
rights of defendants. The court said none of this; it simply asserted that "upon 
further study and reflection," the new rule should be adopted. Id. 
186. 78 N.Y.2d 638,585 N.E.2d 795,578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991). 
187. 318 U.S. 332 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes 18-26. 
188. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d a t  644,585 N.E.2d a t  799-800, 578 N.Y.S.2d a t  487. 
189. Id. a t  644,585 N.E.2d at 799,578 N.Y.S.2d a t  487. The court's supervi- 
sory authority over Rosario violations also includes situations in which disclosure 
has been delayed, or in which the material has been lost or destroyed. Delayed 
disclosure requires the court to determine whether the defendant has been sub- 
stantially prejudiced by the delay. People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 63, 503 
N.E.2d 1011, 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (1986). The &urt in cases of lost or 
destroyed material is empowered to devise appropriate sanctions against the gov- 
ernment to remedy the loss. People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937,940, 524 N.E.2d 
134, 136, 528 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (1988). 
190. People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405 
(1976); People v. Remaley, 26 N.Y.2d 427, 259 N.E.2d 901, 311 N.Y.S.2d 473 
(1970); People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 244 N.E.2d 29, 296 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1968); 
People v. Guzman, 79 Misc. 2d 668, 361 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 
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courts' exercise of a supervisory authority,lgl occasionally refer- 
ring to Cardozo's dictum in Lemon.lg2 Several of these decisions 
predated New York's first discovery statute; the legislature did 
not enact a comprehensive discovery law until 1971.1g3 Other 
decisions, notably a decision by the Court of Appeals,l94 formu- 
lated rules that enlarged the scope of discovery in detailed ways 
that were not provided for by the legislature. Thus, in the ab- 
sence of legislation, the courts allowed the defense the right to  
make independent tests of physical evidence;lgs to  examine the 
defendant's own statements;lg6 to ascertain the identity and 
prior statements of witnesses;l97 to inspect hospital records;l98 
and to inspect autopsy reports.lg9 These rulings can be viewed 
either as legitimate expressions of an inherent supervisory 
1974); People v. Powell, 49 Misc. 2d 624, 268 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. Richmond 
County 1965); People v. Courtney, 40 Misc. 2d 541, 243 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County 1963); People v. Karpeles, 146 Misc. 2d 53, 549 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Crim. 
Ct. Richmond County 1989). 
191. People v. Collins, 75 Misc. 2d 535, 348 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Nassau County Ct. 
1973); People v. Innes, 69 Misc. 2d 429,326 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Westchester County Ct. 
1971); People v. Seaman, 64 Misc. 2d 684, 315 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Dist. Ct. S d o k  
County 1970); People v. North, 96 Misc. 2d 637,409 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Amherst Town 
Ct. 1978). 
192. People v. Courtney, 40 Misc. 2d 541,543,243 N.Y.S.2d 457,459 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County 1963); People v. Utley, 77 Misc. 2d 86, 97, 353 N.Y.S.2d 301, 315 
(Nassau County Ct. 1974); People v. Imes, 69 Misc. 2d 429,430,326 N.Y.S.2d 669, 
671 (Westchester County Ct. 1971); People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 803-04, 
176 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (Kings County Ct. 1958). 
193. N.Y. CFUM. PROC. LAW 5 240 (McKimey 1993). A court has the power to 
take "appropriate actionn for failure to comply with an order of discovery. Id. 
Q 240.70(1) (McKinney 1993). Such action could include dismissal of the charges. 
See People v. Szychwlda, 57 N.Y.2d 719,440 N.E.2d 790,454 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1982). 
194. People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405 
(1976) (authorizing pretrial right of defendant to conduct independent tests as to 
weight and composition of drugs). 
195. People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405 
(1976); People v. Karpales, 146 Misc. 2d 53, 549 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 
Richmond County 1989). 
196. People v. Remaley, 26 N.Y.2d 427, 259 N.E.2d 901, 311 N.Y.S.2d 473 
(1970); People v. Utley, 77 Misc. 2d 86, 353 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Nassau County Ct. 
1974). 
197. People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262,244 N.E.2d 29,296 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1968); 
In re Aspland v. Judges of the County Court, 42 A.D.2d 930 (2d Dep't 1973); People 
v. Guzman, 79 Misc. 2d 668,361 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1974). 
198. People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Kings County Ct. 
1958). 
199. People v. Courtney, 40 Misc. 2d 541, 243 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 1963). 
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power described by Cardozo,200 or as an exercise of an authority 
that is of questionable legitimacy. Interestingly, the cases and 
commentary almost always focus on the merits of the rulings, 
rather than on the source of the power, or the legitimacy of its 
exercise.201 In short, although grounded upon supervisory 
power never specifically articulated, Rosario has been one of the 
most durable decisions of the Court of Appeals.202 
3. Mandating, and Restricting, Rule of Automatic 
Reversal 
In People v. Consolazio,203 the Court of Appeals announced 
a new rule of appellate reversal for Rosario violations. The 
court ruled that harmless-error analysis was inappropriate for 
Rosario violations;2" a per se rule of automatic reversal was de- 
clared.205 Consolazio is a curious decision.206 The court simply 
200. See supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text. 
201. The courts occasionally have refbed to fill legislative gaps either on the 
ground that the legislature intended to cover the field exclusively, or that judicial 
intervention would constitute an improper arrogation of judicial power. See, e.g., 
People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982) (no 
power to take blood samples without court order although no statute specifically 
covers the subject). 
202. People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 615, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1071, 593 
N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (1992). Rosario has been codified in N.Y. C m .  PRoc. LAW 
5 240.45(1) (McKimey 1993). In addition to the provisions in Rosario, the statute 
also provides for reciprocal discovery by the prosecution of written or recorded 
statements by persons other than the defendant. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW 
5 240.45(2) (McKinney & Supp. 1993). 
203. 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976). 
204. Ironically, the discovery violation in Rosario - the failure of the trial 
judge to allow the defense to inspect the prior statements of witnesses - was now 
considered harmless under New York's legislatively-mandated harmless error 
rule. Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 442, 4 542, 1881 (2) N.Y. Laws 1 (current 
version a t  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 470.05(1) (McKinney 1993)). The judgment of 
conviction and sentence of death in Rosario were a h e d .  Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 
293, 173 N.E.2d at 885,213 N.Y.S.2d a t  453. Several cases decided shortly aRer 
Rosario also applied the statutory harmless error rule to preserve convictions de- 
spite Rosario violations. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 10 N.Y.2d 774,177 N.E.2d 
56, 219 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1961). 
205. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d a t  454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d a t  66. 
W e  thus reject arguments that consideration of the significance of the content or 
substance of a witness' prior statements can result in a finding of harmless error." 
Id. 
206. The case is commonly cited for the rule that Rosario is not violated when 
the prosecutor provides the defense with statements that are the "duplicative 
equivalent" of the non-disclosed statements. 
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asserted, without analysis or explanation, that the traditional, 
statutory harmless error test should be abandoned with regard 
to Rosario violations.207 
The court did not explain the source of its power to override 
the statutory mandate. Only in subsequent opinions did the 
court offer a rationale for its adoption of a rule of per se rever- 
sa1.208 For example, in one of these subsequent opinions, the 
court justified this departure from the Rosario rule on the 
ground that it is impossible to quantify, short of outright specu- 
lation, the degree of damage that is inflicted on the defendant's 
case when defense counsel is deprived of cross-examination ma- 
teria1.209 In that case, the court recognized the windfall it was 
giving to the defense; adopting a per se reversal rule "afforded 
the defendant's cross-examination rights even greater protec- 
tion," even if the prosecutor's violation was inadvertent or the 
material was triviaL210 
Apart from its merits, Consolazio is a remarkable example 
of judicial power. The court created a prophylactic per se rever- 
sal rule, seemingly in contravention of the statutory mandate, 
to protect another rule that originally was created not through 
the traditional operation of common law-making, but through 
the court's exercise of an unacknowledged and unexplained in- 
herent power to achieve justice. Even more remarkable is the 
absence of any principled discussion in any of the decisions, 
save for a few oblique allusions, of the legitimacy of the exercise 
of that power. The court apparently assumed either that its ex- 
ercise of power was within the bounds of legitimacy, or that 
even if its exercise approached the outer edges of those bounda- 
ries, the overriding soundness of the result in terms of justice 
and public policy would be sufficient to  insulate it from attack 
for judicial activism and arrogation of power. 
Finally, the scope of the court's supervisory power in the 
discovery context figured prominently, but silently, in People v. 
207. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805,387 N.Y.S.2d at 66; see 
also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 8 470.05(1) (McKinney 19931, which states "[aln appel- 
late court must determine an appeal without regard to technical errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
208. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 643-45, 585 N.E.2d 795, 798- 
99, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486-87 (1991). 
209. Id. at 643-44, 585 N.E.2d at 798-99, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87. 
210. Id. at 644,585 N.E.2d at 799,578 N.Y.S.2d at 487. 
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Jack~on.~l l  There, a majority of four judges of the Court of Ap- 
peals declared that Rosario's per se reversal rule does not apply 
to claims raised collaterally pursuant to section 440.10 of New 
York's Criminal Procedure Law after the defendant's direct ap- 
peals have been exhausted.212 Once again, the supervisory 
power rhetoric of fairness, justice, and public policy permeated 
the opinion.213 However, the debate between the majority and 
the three dissenters concerned the soundness and consistency of 
the new restrictive rule.214 This debate, important as it was, 
largely obscured the equally fundamental question concerning 
the source of the court's power to formulate a discovery rule in 
the first place. Rather, the debate focused on the per se rule of 
reversal and resulted in the court's adopting a new rule of prej- 
udice for claims raised collaterally after the appellate process 
was completed.215 
The majority attempted to place its decision within the 
traditional boundaries of the common law process of statutory 
interpretation grounded on public policy, but it employed the 
rhetoric of supervisory power.216 The majority, it seems, was 
trying to strike a balance between a responsible exercise of su- 
pervisory power as reflected in the Rosario-Consolazio rule, and 
an even broader supervisory ruling that could be attacked as 
excessive and irresponsible. It acknowledged that Rosario was 
a nonconstitutional exercise of judicial power to achieve justice, 
and that the per se reversal rule was a judicial creation to 
achieve the purposes of Rosario.217 
Having established Rosario as doctrinally sound, the ma- 
jority went on to observe that there are statutory as well as pru- 
dential limitations that counsel against extending Rosario's per 
se reversal rule to collateral attacks.218 Section 440.10 does not 
211. 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 ~ . ~ . 2 d  795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991). 
212. Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 802,578 N.Y.S.2d at 490. 
213. The words "fair" or "fairness" are used 13 times; the word "policy" 30 
times; and the phrase "right sense of justice" four times. 
214. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 647-48, 650-51, 585 N.E.2d at 801-04, 578 
N.Y.S.2d at  489-92. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 644-45, 585 N.E.2d at 798-99, 578 N . Y . s . ~ ~  a t  486-87. 
218. Id. at 645-46,585 N.E.2d at 799-800,578 N.Y.S.2d at 487-89. The major- 
ity's attempt to justify its result on the basis of statutory construction is questiona- 
ble. The majority asserted that "the Legislature has already spoken" in requiring 
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contain any language specifically dealing with Rosario 'viola- 
tions. Notwithstanding the absence of this language, the court 
assumed that Rosario claims were most appropriately consid- 
ered under subsection (l)(f) of section 440.10 dealing with "im- 
proper and prejudicial conduct."219 The court then interpreted 
this subsection as containing an explicit legislative requirement 
that a petitioner demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail on a 
Rosario claim.220 
Of course, when Rosario and Consolazio were decided, the 
legislature also required a showing of prejudice before judg- 
ments could be reversed on appeal. In the end, justice and pol- 
icy - the driving forces behind supervisory power - dictated 
the result. In Jackson, the compelling societal interest in the 
finality of judgments counselled against extending the per se re- 
versal rule to collateral m o t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the New York courts 
have in fact exercised an inherent supervisory power to formu- 
late discovery rules in criminal cases, but have usually re- 
frained from articulating the precise source of that authority. 
The language often appears vague and mysterious; the deci- 
sions seem ad hoc and inconsistent. This approach to an ex- 
defendants filing motions under section 440.10 to demonstrate Id. a t  
641, 585 N.E.2d a t  797, 578 N.Y.S.2d a t  485. The legislature, however, had al- 
ready spoken in codifying the doctrine of harmless error, which the court overrode 
in Consolazio. Moreover, since section 440.10 does not contain any language spe- 
cifically dealing with Rosario violations, the court could have concluded from that 
omission that the legislature intended to exclude Rosario claims from collateral 
attack. 
Alternatively, the court could have concluded that despite its omission from 
the statute, Rosario itself was a common law creation, and therefore the rule and 
its per se reversal component would remain intact. The court could have inter- 
preted section 440.10 to cover Rosario violations, but found the prejudice require- 
ment as being inherent in any Rosario violation. This, in essence, is what the 
court did in Consolazio. Indeed, this is the interpretation adopted by the dissent in 
Jackson. Id. a t  653-54,585 N.E.2d a t  798-99,578 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87. The major- 
ity chose none of these options. 
219. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d a t  645, 585 N.E.2d a t  799,578 N.Y.S.2d a t  487. 
220. Id. a t  646, 585 N.E.2d a t  800, 578 N.Y.S.2d a t  488. "The statute by its 
very terms affords a remedy only if the defendant's trial was affected by conduct 
that was both improper and prejudicial." Id. 
221. Id. a t  649,585 N.E.2d at 802,578 N.Y.S.2d a t  490. 
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tremely important area of judicial authority is attributable to 
the nature of the power itself. To the extent that supervisory 
power seeks to regulate matters ancillary to the criminal trial, 
and without any written guidance contained in either the fed- 
eral or state constitutions or statutes, it is vulnerable to claims 
of judicial activism, unprincipled subjectivism, and a violation 
of separation of powers.222 
B. Supervising Grand Jury Practice 
The relationship between the judiciary and the grand jury 
is ambiguous at best. Insofar as the grand jury is viewed as 
"part of the judicial process,"223 or "an arm of the ~0~rt,"224 it 
would seem to be uniquely subject to the court's supervisory 
power to enforce proper standards of conduct. However, to the 
extent that the grand jury is viewed as an independent investi- 
gating agency, and closely affiliated with the executive branch 
as represented by the prosecutor,225 judicial intervention would 
seem to violate the principle of separation of powers. Although 
the federal courts have lately withdrawn from the broad super- 
vision of grand jury practice they previously exercised,z26 the 
New York courts have frequently intervened to supervise the 
integrity of the grand jury process, and to ensure that prosecu- 
tors behave fairly.227 
The grand jury is one of the most powerful instruments in 
the arsenal of law enforcement.228 Historically an independent 
body standing as a buffer between the citizen and the state, the 
grand jury today has many of the hallmarks of a "prosecutorial 
222. See supm notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
223. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940). 
224. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960). 
225. The grand jury has been referred to as "a prosecutorial agency." United 
States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y.), a f d ,  441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); accord United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 
459,461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959) (deeming the grand jury "a law 
enforcement agency"). 
226. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text. 
227. See in* notes 245-336 and accompanying text. 
228. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFPALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTI- 
TUTION ON TRIAL (1977). Judge Learned Hand vividly described the grand jury in 
the following way: "Save for torture, it would be hard to find a more effective tool of 
tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked exparte examination." United 
States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567,573 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954). 
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agency,"229 possessing an awesome range of powers, and empha- 
sizing secret interrogation and accusation as opposed to exoner- 
a t i ~ n . ~ ~ O  In accord with the oft-stated principle that "the public 
has a right to every man's evidence,"231 the grand jury is em- 
powered to summon any person before it and, subject to modest 
constitutional constraints,232 to compel that person to disclose 
under oath everything he or she knows about the matter under 
inquiry.233 
In New York State, the modern grand jury is hedged 
with broader constitutional and statutory restrictions than in 
the federal system. As a creature of the common law, the 
grand jury's pre-statutory powers in New York State have 
been described as "vague and unlimited."234 The first state 
constitution, ratified in 1777, made no reference to the grand 
jury.235 TO provide "a clear and well understood definition 
229. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. a t  1153. 
230. See generally Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedure and Problems, 9 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. WBS. 681 (1973); Note, The Grand Jury an Investigating 
Body, 74 IIARv. L. REV. 590 (1961). 
231. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). 
232. The Fourth Amendment limits the scope of a grand jury subpoena for 
documents to information that is reasonably related to the grand jury's investiga- 
tion. See generally See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Oklahoma Press 
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). The Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
against self-incrimination often figures prominently in protecting grand jury wit- 
nesses. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Counselman v. Hitch- 
cock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). However, the privilege may properly be overridden by a 
grant of immunity. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
233. The Supreme Court has stated: "[Tlhe witness is bound not only to at- 
tend but to tell what he knows in answer to questions framed for the purpose of 
bringing out the truth of the matter under inquiry." Blair v. United States, 250 
U.S. 273,282 (1919). Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently reinforced the 
grand jury's broad powers, disallowing witnesses from challenging questions as 
incompetent or irrelevant, or from objecting that the grand jury is exceeding its 
authority, "for this is no concern of [the witness]." Id. The Court has held that a 
witness has no right to remain silent, United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 
581 (1976) (plurality opinion), nor any right to counsel inside the grand jury room, 
Id. a t  581, and that the prosecutor has no duty to advise the witness that he or she 
may be a target of the investigation. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 
(1977). 
234. In re Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 150, 173 N.E.2d 21, 23, 212 
N.Y.S.2d 33, 36 (1961) (quoting COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS ON 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT TO N.Y. STATE LEGISLATURE, a t  115 
(1849)). 
235. See generally N.Y. CONST. of 1777. 
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of [the grand jury's] powers,"236 New York's legislature in 
1849 enacted several provisions dealing with grand jury 
The state constitution subsequently was amended to add 
provisions empowering grand jury a~tion.~38 Moreover, to the 
extent that the state constitution explicitly declares that the 
common law is continued "subject to such alterations as the leg- 
islature shall make concerning the same,"239 the detailed and 
comprehensive code subsequently enacted with respect to grand 
jury procedure Yeave[s] no doubt that the Legislature mani- 
fested its intention to supplant the common law on the subject 
[of grand jury practice]."240 However, no code can cover every 
contingency. Aside from their interpretive responsibilities, 
courts are called upon to fill procedural gaps.241 Additionally, 
courts may be asked to oversee prosecutorial conduct inside the 
grand jury, even though the conduct is not claimed to violate 
specific constitutional or statutory guarantees.242 
Accordingly, in the absence of statutes specifically covering 
the subject, the New York courts have formulated detailed pro- 
cedural rules for grand jury practice when no specific rule ex- 
i s t ~ . ~ ~ ~  The courts have also monitored the prosecutor's conduct 
in the grand jury to ensure fairness.244 The courts predicate 
236. COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS ON CODE OF CRIMINAL PRO- 
CEDURE, REWRT TO N.Y. STATE LEGISLATURE, a t 115 (1849). 
237. CODE C m .  PRoc. 50 223-260. 
238. N.Y. CONST. art. I, 5 6 states, in relevant part, "[nlo person shall be held 
to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime . . . unless on indictment of a 
grand jury." 
239. N.Y. CONST. art. I, 5 14. 
240. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d a t  149, 173 N.E.2d a t  23, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 36. 
241. See supm note 130, and accompanying text. Understandably, the deter- 
mination of whether a gap exists, or whether the legislature adverted to the issue 
being judicially examined, is itself a question of statutory interpretation. As Hart 
and Wechsler put it, "statutory interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a 
spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative advertence to the issue at hand attenu- 
ates." See P. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER ON THE-FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973). For an illustration of this issue in the context 
of the court's exercise of supervisory power, see generally In re Holtzman v. 
Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988) (holding that a 
court has no inherent supervisory power to dismiss criminal charge for failure to 
prosecute even though statutory language does not preclude such power.). 
242. See discussion infm part V.B.3. 
243. See discussion infia part V.B.3. 
244. See discussion infm part V.B.3. 
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this intervention on two distinct grounds: first, the existence of 
statutory language that contemplates some degree of judicial 
supervision over grand jury practice, and second, an inherent 
authority to ensure fairness in a setting which by its very na- 
ture can be arbitrary and oppressive. However, judicial inter- 
vention has been erratic and inconsistent, often determined by 
the way the particular court perceives the grand jury's role. 
This response is not surprising given the grand jury's hybrid 
role to charge guilty persons with crimes and to protect inno- 
cent persons from unfounded accusations. 
1. Overriding Legislative Will 
The New York courts' supervision of grand jury practice oc- 
casionally has produced anomalous results, particularly when 
the courts are required either to overlook clear statutory man- 
dates, or fill gaps that the legislature left uncovered. An early 
decision of the Court of Appeals illustrates this problem. In Peo- 
ple v. Glen,245 the court declared that it had the inherent power 
to dismiss an indictment on grounds not provided for by statute. 
The defendant had moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming 
that improper evidence and erroneous legal instructions had 
been given to the grand j~ry.246 
The Code of Criminal Procedure set forth only two grounds 
for dismissa1,247 neither of which applied, and explicitly stated 
that "in no other" circumstances could an indictment be dis- 
missed.248 Lower courts had interpreted this provision differ- 
ently, some holding that it completely negatived a court's power 
to dismiss indictments upon any ground other than those enu- 
merated,249 whereas other courts held that the legislative power 
"could not limit or interfere with the inherent power of the 
courts to dismiss indictments upon other substantial grounds 
[than] those enumerated."2s0 
245. 173 N.Y. 395.66 N.E. 112 (1903). 
246. Id. at 398, 66 N.E. at 113-114. 
247. Code of Criminal F'rocedure, ch. 442, 5 313, 1881 (2) N.Y. Laws 1, as 
amended by Act of May 14, 1897, ch. 427, 1, 1897 (1) N.Y. Laws 569, 569-70. 
248. See Glen, 173 N.Y. at 399,66 N.E. at 114. 
249. See, e.g., People v. Rutherford, 47 AD. 209, 62 N.Y.S. 224 (3d Dep't 
1899); People v. Willis, 23 Misc. 568, 52 N.Y.S. 808 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1898); 
People v. Winant, 24 Misc. 361, 53 N.Y.S. 695 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1895). 
250. Glen, 173 N.Y. at 399, 66 N.E. at 114. 
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The Glen court acknowledged that the legislature had the 
"undoubted right to regulate mere matters of procedure."251 
However, courts have an inherent power "to set aside indict- 
ments whenever it has been made to appear that they have 
been found without evidence, or upon illegal or incompetent tes- 
timony."252 The court stated that "[tlhis power is based upon 
the inherent right and duty of the courts to protect the citizen in 
his constitutional prerogatives, and to prevent oppression or 
persec~tion."~53 
The court thus raised the issue, but did not decide, whether 
the above statute, as applied, violated the constitutional rights 
of the defendant.2" It found that the acts complained of did not 
taint the indictment.255 The court's assertion that "no legisla- 
tive enactment can be permitted to deprive the citizen of any of 
his constitutional rightsn256 is a truism. The court did not ex- 
plain the nature of the constitutional rights that may have been 
implicated, because it spoke in vague and general terms. None- 
theless, Glen may be viewed as one of those early "glimmeringsn 
of the court's willingness to invoke an inherent supervisory 
power that is inspired by constitutional values, but not neces- 
sarily required by specific constitutional rules. 
2. 'Gap-Filling to Prevent Unfairness 
Glen plainly presents a more difficult occasion for judicial 
intervention than a case in which no statutory provision di- 
rectly addresses the issue. The latter case poses less of a chal- 
lenge to judicial legitimacy. The court may choose either to fill 
the gap itself, or refrain from intervening on the ground that 
this would constitute an encroachment upon the grand jury's 
power or the legislature's prerogative. A controversial instance 
of judicial intervention is In re Wood v. H~ghes,25~ an opinion 
written by Judge Stanley Fuld in 1961, the same year in which 
he wrote the opinion in People v. Rosari0.~58 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 400, 63 N.E. at 114. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 403,66 N.E. at 115. 
256. Id. at 400, 66 N.E. at 114. 
257. 9 N.Y.2d 144, 173 N.E.2d 21, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961). 
258. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881,213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961). 
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The issue in Wood was whether a grand jury, whose inves- 
tigation of misconduct by public officials warranted no indict- 
ment, could nevertheless issue a report censuring certain 
officials for nonindictable misconduct, despite the fact that no 
power to  issue such a report was authorized by constitution or 
statute.259 According to the majority, the grand jury's historic 
function is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
charge a crime.260 If there is such evidence, the grand jury 
ought to find an indictment. If there is no evidence, the grand 
jury "must dismiss the charges or remain ~ilent."~el 
The statute governing grand jury conduct contained no lan- 
guage supporting either interpretation. However, considera- 
tions of fairness and public policy dictated the result. A grand 
jury report, according to the majority, is viewed by the public as 
indistinguishable from a formal accusation, and it invites the 
same "public condemnation and opprobrium as if [the person] 
had been indicted."262 That is unfair, the majority suggested, 
for such procedure does not afford the accused any of the protec- 
tions accorded one who is indicted.263 Thus, in the absence of 
any explicit constitutional or statutory language authorizing 
259. Both the state constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly 
authorized grand juries to conduct such inquiries. N.Y. CONST. art. I, $ 6 ("The 
power of grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public of- 
ficers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of information in connection 
with such inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law."); Code of Crimi- 
nal Procedure, ch. 442,s 260, 1881 (2) N.Y. Laws 1, as amended by Act of June 7, 
1939, ch. 770, 1939 (1) N.Y. Laws 1823; Act of Mar. 29, 1954, ch. 305, $6,  1954 
N.Y. Laws 935, 956 (renumbering as section 253(2)); Act of Apr. 29, 1955, ch. 864, 
$ 4, 1955 N.Y. Laws 2044,2053. 
However, the power to issue reports was not specifically authorized, even 
though grand juries had followed this practice for many years. In re Wood, 9 
N.Y.2d a t  158, 173 N.E.2d a t  28-29, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (Desmond, C.J., dissent- 
ing). The only previous New ~ d r k  appellate court decision on.the subject permit- 
ted such a report, although most of the courts in other jurisdictions which 
considered the matter found "the grand jury report [both] legally unauthorized and 
morally obnoxious." Id., 9 N.Y.2d a t  155, 173 N.E.2d a t  26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 40. 
260. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d at 154, 173 N.E.2d a t  26,212 N.Y.S.2d a t  39. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
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the report, but animated by a spirit of fairness, the court out- 
lawed such reports.264 
The separate dissenting opinions of Chief Judge Charles 
Desmond and Judge Charles Froessel contended that history, 
tradition, and practice supported the grand jury's power to is- 
sue reports on official misconduct.265 The dissenters pointed to 
another of the court's decisions, People v. Stern.266 In Stern, the 
court upheld, over Fuld's strong dissent, the grand jury's "holdo- 
ver power" to continue to hear cases well beyond its initial term 
and to consider new matters unrelated to the purpose for which 
it was initially impaneled.267 Stern construed the court's super- 
visory power over grand jury matters quite narrowly: "Tradi- 
tionally, our courts have afforded the Grand Jury the widest 
possible latitude in the exercise of these powers and insisted 
that in the absence of a clear constitutional or legislative ex- 
pression they may not be curtailed."268 
Invoking this recent injunction against judicial usurpation 
of the grand jury's power, Desmond stated that "judges sit not 
to enforce their subjective notions of fairness but to apply the 
law."269 Froessel acknowledged that vigorous policy arguments 
could be made on both sides, and that there may be erring or 
misguided grand juries that might abuse their and 
stated: "The public, too, has rights."271 The public sits on the 
grand jury, and pays its expenses.272 The public is entitled to 
know the results of investigations into matters of public con- 
cern.273 When a practice has continued for so many years, 
264. Grand jury reports are presently authorized by statute subject to judicial 
supervision to protect the rights of individuals named in the report. See N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 190.85 (McKimey 1993). 
265. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d a t  156-68, 173 N.E.2d a t  27-35, 212 N.Y.S.2d a t  41-52. 
266. 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148 N.E.2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). 
267. As a consequence of Stern, the legislature has curtailed the power of a 
grand jury to consider new matters during a period in which its existence has been 
extended. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 190.15 (McKinney 1993); see also People v. 
Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 84, 535 N.E.2d 275, 538 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1989). 
268. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d a t  661,148 N.E.2d a t  401,171 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (citations 
omitted). 
269. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d a t  160, 173 N.E.2d a t  30,212 N.Y.S.2d a t  45 (Desmond, 
J., dissenting). 
270. Id. a t  166,173 N.E.2d at 34,212 N.Y.S.2d a t  50 (Froessel, J., dissenting). 
271. Id. a t  167, 173 N.E.2d at 34, 212 N.Y.S.2d a t  51. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
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Froessel stated, courts "have no right to strike it down - that 
must be done by the people themselves directly, or through 
their duly elected representatives in the Legislature."274 
3. Formulating Subsidiary Rules of Grand Jury 
Procedure 
A conflict similar to the one in Wood was debated in In re 
Morgenthau v. Altman.276 There, a majority of the Court of Ap- 
peals upheld an order directing the prosecutor to present his 
witnesses first, before permitting the target of the grand jury to 
testify.276 The prosecutor had sought an order prohibiting the 
trial judge from interfering with the grand jury's traditional 
power to determine what order to call witne~ses.27~ Prohibition 
was denied by the appellate division,278 and the Court of Ap- 
peals affirmed, stating "[tlhe order in which witnesses are 
presented before the Grand Jury is a matter of procedure, 
within the supervisory jurisdiction of the court . . . . "27s 
- - - 
274. Id. Following Wood, the New York courts have formulated detailed pro- 
cedural requirements for grand jury practice in the absence of direct statutory au- 
thority. The following are illustrative: courts have instructed the district attorney 
to establish a prima facie case before calling the defendant as  a witness, In re 
Morgenthau v. Altman, 58 N.Y.2d 1057,449 N.E.2d 409,462 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1983); 
directed the district attorney to re-present the case to another grand jury prior to 
voting an indictment, People v. Doe, 151 Misc. 2d 829, 574 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings County 1991); allowed a defendant's motion to amend the indictment, Peo- 
ple v. Cirillo, 100 Misc. 2d 527, 419 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1979); 
resubmitted sua sponte a charge to a second grand jury, People ex rel. Besser v. 
Ruthazer, 3 A.D.2d 137, 158 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1st Dep't 1957); People v. Besser, 207 
Misc. 692,140 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1955); and fashioned rules of procedure 
for the examination of witnesses and the legal instructions given to the grand jury, 
see infia notes 310-336 and accompanying text. 
These decisions specifically allude to the courts' inherent power to supervise 
the grand jury. To the extent that these decisions recognize and apply the courts' 
supervisory authority, they are vulnerable to the charge that the court is arrogat- 
ing a power that is not clearly judicial, but belongs instead to the grand jury and 
the prosecutor. 
275. 58 N.Y.2d 1057,449 N.E.2d 409,462 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1983). 
276. Id. a t  1058,449 N.E.2d a t  409,462 N.Y.S.2d a t  629. 
277. Id. a t  1059, 449 N.E.2d at 410, 462 N.Y.S.2d a t  630 (Simons, J., 
dissenting). 
278. In re Morgenthau v. Altman, 89 kD.2d 531,453 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1st Dep't 
1982). 
279. Morgenthau, 58 N.Y.2d at 1059,449 N.E.2d a t  409,462 N.Y.S.2d a t  629. 
Judge Joseph Bellacosa, in his Practice Commentary to Criminal Procedure Law 
section 190.25, has questioned whether the court definitively addressed the merits 
of the controversy, or merely examined the procedural propriety of issuing the writ 
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Judge Richard Simons wrote a forceful dissenting opinion, 
accusing the majority of disregarding established law, and 
usurping the powers of a coordinate branch of government.280 
He pointed to People v. Sexton,281 where the court ruled that a 
grand jury is a separate and independent body free from the 
court's restraint as to its methods of procedure "so far as they 
are not controlled by statute or immemorial usage having the 
force of law."282 Sexton stated: "One of the attributes and pow- 
ers of this independent existence is to decide when and in what 
order witnesses shall be called . . . . "283 
Simons described the grand jury as performing a govern- 
mental function that is "executive in nature, not judicial."284 He 
acknowledged that courts traditionally have exercised "a gen- 
eral and largely undefined supervisory power over the actions of 
the grand jury" for purposes of impaneling the jury, implement- 
ing the grand jury's contempt power, and ensuring that the 
power of the prosecutor is not abused.286 However, he stated 
that "it has never been contended to my knowledge that the 
court has any general supervisory power over the procedures 
used by the Grand Jury to receive and evaluate evidence."286 
Simons accused the majority of "recastEing1 the very nature of 
that body and in the name of 'fairness' mak[ing] the inquiry a 
quasi-adversarial and quasi-adjudicative process, something 
that it is not and never was intended to be."287 
The interplay between the court's supervisory power and 
an arguably inconsistent statute is evident in the cases dealing 
with the court's power to authorize the defendant to inspect the 
transcribed minutes of the grand jury.2* This issue is closely 
of prohibition. See N.Y. CFUM. PRoc. LAW 8 190.25 commentary a t  49 (McKimey 
Supp. 1994) (1983 supplementary practice commentary). The court's forceful 
statement quoted in the text would seem to refute the claim that it did not defini- 
tively rule on the merits. 
280. Morgenthau, 58 N.Y.2d a t  1060,449 N.E.2d at 410,462 N.Y.S.2d a t  630- 
31. 
281. 187 N.Y. 495, 80 N.E. 396 (1907). 
282. Id. a t  513,80 N.E. at 402. 
283. Id. 
284. Morgenthau, 58 N.Y.2d a t  1060,449 N.E.2d at 410,462 N.Y.S.2d a t  630. 
285. Id. a t  1060-61, 449 N.E.2d a t  411, 462 N.Y.S.2d a t  631. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. See cases cited infia notes 294-95. 
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related to discovery.289 As Cardozo noted in Lemon, the com- 
mon law aversion to pretrial discovery generally did not extend 
to the disclosure of grand jury minute~.~gO Indeed, the defend- 
ant in Lemon asked for and received apparently without any 
resistance the transcripts of the grand jury testimony.291 Car- 
dozo observed that courts had an inherent power to order in- 
spection of grand jury minutes,292 and justified this practice in 
the interests of accurate pleadings and to enable defendants to 
file dismissal motions. Although the common law rules were re- 
placed by legislation,293 the courts continued to interpret the 
practice through a patchwork of inconsistent and confbsing 
r u l e ~ . ~ 9 ~  
Under the Criminal Procedure Law,295 there is no express 
limitation on the power of a court to order physical release of 
the grand jury minutes to  the defendant, and some courts have 
exercised their supervisory power by ordering such re lea~e.~~6 
However, even absent legislation covering the issue directly, the 
Court of Appeals construed this omission as a tacit legislative 
declaration that physical release is unauthorized.297 The prac- 
tice therefore was invalidated as an unwarranted exercise of su- 
pervisory authority on a matter over which the legislature had 
clearly spoken "in unmuted strains."298 
289. See discussion supm part V.A. 
290. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24,31,156 N.E. 84,86 
(1927). 
291. Id. a t  27, 156 N.E. a t  84. 
292. Id. a t  31, 156 N.E. a t  86. 
293. See Proskin v. County Court, 30 N.Y.2d 15, 19,280 N.E.2d 875,876,330 
N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (1972). 
294. JafTe v. Scheinman, 47 N.Y.2d 188, 193, 390 N.E.2d 1165, 1167, 417 
N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (1979). Some courts examined the minutes in camera before 
rendering a decision, Id. (citations omitted); other courts allowed the defendant to 
receive the minutes, Id. (citations omitted). However, in either case, inspection 
was allowed only as  an ancillary remedy to a motion to dismiss an indictment, not 
a discovery device to assist the defendant in preparing for trial. In re Proskin v. 
County Court, 30 N.Y.2d 15,21,280 N.E.2d 875,877,330 N.Y.S.2d 44,47 (1972). 
295. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 210.30 (McKinney 1993). 
296. Jaffe, 47 N.Y.2d a t  194,390 N.E.2d at 1168,417 N.Y.S.2d at 244 (quoting 
Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 210.30). 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
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4.  Restraining Prosecutorial Overreaching 
With respect to evidence that prosecutors are required to 
present to the grand jury, or legal instructions that prosecutors 
are required to give, one would expect a court's supervisory 
power to be exercised infrequently. Given the traditional inde- 
pendence of the grand jury, the judiciary's reluctance to impede 
that body's investigative function, and the existence of statutes 
broadly covering these subjects,299 judicial intervention would 
seem inappropriate. This is particularly so in the absence of 
any indication of prosecutorial overreaching. 
However, there are occasions when the interest in affording 
grand juries wide latitude to investigate crime conflicts with the 
interest in ensuring procedural fairness and maintaining the 
grand jury's integrity. Courts in such cases more readily invoke 
their supervisory authority to monitor the process and check 
any unfairness. In marked contrast to the dthdrawal of fed- 
eral supervisory power over prosecutorial conduct in the grand 
j~ry,300 the New York courts have shown a greater willingness 
to prescribe detailed rules governing the interrogation of wit- 
nesses301 and the legal instructions given to grand juries.302 It 
is difficult to reconcile these cases. Several of them appear to be 
ad hoc and represent a particular court's conception of the 
proper role of the grand jury and the prosecutor's duty to be- 
have fairly. 
A good example of the courts' s u p e ~ s o r y  power to prevent 
unfairness is the judicial response to claims that prosecutors oc- 
casionally summon witnesses before grand juries for the illegiti- 
mate purpose of trapping them into committing pe jury rather 
than for the legitimate purpose of seeking the truth.303 Several 
299. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 190.25 (McKinney 1993) (proceedings and 
operations); id. 5 190.30 (rules of evidence); id 8 190.55 (authority and duties of 
prosecutor); id. 5 190.40 (witnesses, compulsion of evidence, and immunity). 
300. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. 
301. See infra notes 302-330; see also'People v. DiFaliso, 79 N.Y.2d 836, 588 
N.E.2d 80,580 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1992) (trial court's power to participate in grand jury 
proceedings to determine competency-of child witness); People v. Thomas, N.Y. 
L.J., Jan. 1, 1994, a t  25, col. 6 (Crim. Ct. Queens County) (trial court's power to 
limit evidence that prosecutor can use in grand jury to impeach defendant's 
credibility). 
302. See infia notes 332-36. 
303. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Perjury Trap, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 
624 (1981). 
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of these cases have involved prominent public and political 
figures,304 which by itself may account for the court's interest in 
overseeing the proceedings. The courts in these cases have at- 
tempted to fashion coherent and meaningfid standards for the 
interrogation of witnesses.305 
Another instance of judicial supervision relates to the pros- 
ecutor's duty to provide the grand jury with exculpatory evi- 
dence. Prior to United States v. Williams,306 it was unclear 
whether federal prosecutors had a duty to provide a grand jury 
with evidence that would negate guilt.307 Under a fairness 
model, disclosure would seem to be warranted, for "if the prose- 
cutor does not produce the evidence, no one will."308 It is thus 
unfair to allow the grand jury to charge a crime without being 
apprised of evidence that would reveal the charge as unfounded. 
On the other hand, under a functional model, the grand jury is 
-- -- - 
304. People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251,385 N.E.2d 1231,413 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1978) 
(Justice of Supreme Court of New York); People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88,425 N.Y.S.2d 
122 (2d Dep't 1980) (New York attorney); People v. Brust, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1976, 
a t  12 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County) (Justice of Supreme Court of New York); People v. 
Blumenthal, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16,1976, a t  7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Majority Leader 
of the New York State Assembly); People v. Monaghan, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14,1975, a t  
8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (former New York City Police Commissioner). 
305. Compare People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 264, 385 N.E.2d 1231, 413 N.Y.S.2d 
302 (1978) (finding a pe jury  trap) with People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240,385 
N.E.2d 1218, 413 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1978) (finding no pejury trap) and People v. 
Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232,385 N.E.2d 1214,413 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1978) (finding no 
pejury trap). 
The results are problematic for two reasons. First, the court's attempt to as- 
sess the importance or memorability of the subject matter about which the prose- 
cutor is examining the witness often appears wholly subjective, and probably not a 
matter within the court's competence. Second, the court's evaluation of the vigor 
with which the prosecutor attempts to stimulate the witness's memory is also 
fraught with broad subjectivity and requires a court to divine the prosecutor's mo- 
tive, not a matter easily susceptible of judicial inquiry. 
To insulate his examination from being'branded a "pe jury  trap," prosecutors 
apparently must probe with ~ ~ c i e n t  earnestness to demonstrate that the inquiry 
is being conducted in good faith and not in an effort to elicit pe jury. Thus, judicial 
oversight in this area is well-intentioned, but extremely difficult to implement, and 
thus questionable as a matter of judicial policy. 
306. 112 S.Ct. 1735 (1992). 
307. See Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence to an 
Investigating Grand Jury, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1514, 1514 (1977). 
308. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 621 (N.D. 
Okla. 1977). 
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not designed to adjudicate guilt but to bring criminal charges.309 
The trial is the adversarial setting for determining the truth. 
The Court of Appeals has addressed this issue in two cases. 
In People v. Pelchat,310 the court invoked the fairness model to 
dismiss an indictment. The prosecutor presented evidence to a 
grand jury through a police officer's testimony that the defend- 
ant was a participant in drug activity.311 The defendant 
pleaded guilty to the charge, but subsequently learned that the 
police officer informed the prosecutor that he had not actually 
observed the defendant engage in criminal activity, but had 
simply misunderstood the prosecutor's question in the grand 
jury.312 Defendant sought to have his guilty plea vacated; the 
prosecutor resisted on the ground that he did not seek the in- 
dictment by the knowing use of perjured or mistaken 
testimony.313 
In a unanimous opinion written by Judge Simons, the court 
emphasized the prosecutor's "duty of fair dealing" not only at 
trial but in pretrial proceedings.314 The court did not suggest 
the extent of such duty, or whether it requires a prosecutor to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The opinion al- 
luded to cases in which courts recognized their supervisory 
power to dismiss indictments that are based on no evidence,315 
pe jured testimony,316 hearsay testimony,317 or evidence ob- 
tained by a prosecutor for improper motives.318 The "cardinal 
purposen of the grand jury, said the court, "is to act as a shield 
against prosecutorial excesses and this protection is destroyed 
and the integrity of the criminal justice system impaired if a 
prosecution may proceed even after the District Attorney learns 
that jurisdiction is based upon an empty indictment."319 Thus, 
the prosecutor violated his duty of fair dealing by allowing pro- 
309. Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978). 
310. 62 N.Y.2d 97,464 N.E.2d 447,476 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1984). 
311. Id. a t  100, 464 N.E.2d at 448, 476 N.Y.S.2d a t  80. 
312. Id. a t  101, 464 N.E.2d a t  449, 476 N.Y.S.2d a t  81. 
313. Id. a t  103,464 N.E.2d a t  450, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 82. 
314. Id. a t  104, 464 N.E.2d a t  450-51, 476 N.Y.S.2d a t  82-83. 
315. People v. Glen, 173 N.Y. 395, 66 N.E. 112 (1903). 
316. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974). 
317. United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). 
318. In re Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 347 N.E.2d 915, 383 
N.Y.S.2d 590 (1976). 
319. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d a t  108,464 N.E.2d a t  453,476 N.Y.S.2d a t  85. 
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ceedings to continue on an indictment that he knew rested 
solely on false evidence. 
More recently, however, in People v. Mitchell,320 the Court 
retreated from the broad language in Pelchat, and suggested 
that judges should be more restrained in exercising their super- 
visory function to dismiss indictments on grounds of 
prosecutorial unfairness.321 The four-judge majority, in an opin- 
ion by Judge George Bundy Smith, framed the issue as whether 
a prosecutor is required to present to a grand jury exculpatory 
statements of a defendant in addition to the inculpatory state- 
ments which were submitted.322 The majority ruled that there 
is no duty of disclosure.323 Three judges, in a strong dissenting 
opinion by Judge Vito Titone, argued that the prosecutor's duty 
of fairness was violated by the nondi~closure.3~4 The majority 
opinion adopted a broad functional model. Thus, the majority 
argued, the Criminal Procedure Law states that "in general, 
where appropriate" the rules of evidence applicable to trials are 
also applicable to grand jury proceedings.325 The defendant's 
exculpatory statements were inadmissible hearsay and thus not 
required to be submitted.326 Moreover, the purpose of an indict- 
ment is to bring a defendant to  trial based on prima facie evi- 
dence which, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction. If the 
defendant desired to present exculpatory evidence to the grand 
jury, she had the right to do so.327 In conclusion, the majority 
stated, "The People maintain broad discretion in presenting 
their case to the Grand Jury and need not seek evidence 
favorable to the defendant or present all of their evidence tend- 
ing to exculpate the accu~ed."~~8 
The dissenters would have invoked a much broader super- 
visory authority over the proceedings. They accused the major- 
ity of ignoring the prosecutor's duty of fair dealing and candor 
320. 82 N.Y.2d 509,626 N.E.2d 630, 605 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1993). 
321. Id. at 514, 626 N.E.2d at 633, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58. 
322. Id. at 510, 626 N.E.2d at 630,605 N.Y.S.2d at 655. 
323. Id. at 513, 626 N.E.2d at 633,605 N.Y.S.2d at 657. 
324. Id, at 515, 626 N.E.2d at 633,605 N.Y.S.2d at 658. 
325. 82 N.Y.2d 509,626 N.E.2d 630,605 N.Y.S.2d 655 (refemng to N.Y. CFUM. 
PROC. LAW 8 190.30(1) (McKimey 1993)). 
326. Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d at 513,626 N.E.2d at 631-32,605 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57. 
327. Id. at 513-14, 626 N.E.2d at 632-33,605 N.Y.S.2d at 657. 
328. Id. at 515, 626 N.E.2d at 633,605 N.Y.S.2d at 658. 
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recognized in Pelchat, and contended that there was no articul- 
able reason for the prosecutor's nondisclos~re.3~9 Even worse, 
said the dissent, by presenting selective portions of defendant's 
statements, the prosecutor effectively eliminated from the 
grand jury's consideration the exculpatory defense of justifica- 
tion.3S0 The prosecutor thus presented a "distorted" case 
against the defendant, thereby rendering the grand jury process 
"hopelessly skewed and fatally defective."331 
Finally, in the absence of statutory guidance, the courts 
have formulated detailed rules of procedure governing those de- 
fenses about which prosecutors must instruct the grand jury. 
These decisions appear rigid and arbitrary; they are rational- 
ized in terms of the functional role of the grand jury. Prior to 
People v. Valles,332 several New York courts required prosecu- 
tors to submit to grand juries various legal defenses.333 In Val- 
les, the Court of Appeals adopted a bright line test, requiring 
prosecutors to submit only those defenses that have the "poten- 
tial for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution."334 
Thus, defenses that result in exoneration - for example, justi- 
fication, entrapment, or duress - require submission. De- 
fenses in mitigation - for example, extreme emotional 
disturbance - do not require submission. The court subse- 
quently held in People v. Lanca~ter-3~~ that the defense of mental 
disease or defect need not be submitted, because even though it 
may result in exoneration, it does not necessarily eliminate a 
needless prosecution, for the defendant may still be required to 
undergo further proceedings following such adjudication.336 
329. Id. a t  516-19, 626 N.E.2d at 633-36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 659-61. 
330. Id. a t  519, 626 N.E.2d a t  636, 605 N.Y.S.2d a t  660-61. 
331. Id. 
332. 62 N.Y.2d 36,464 N.E.2d 418,476 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1984). 
333. See, e.g., People v. Rosenbaum, 107 Misc. 2d 501,435 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. 
Ct. Rockland County 1981) (claim of right as to taking); People v. Karassik, 90 
Misc. 2d 839,396 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (entrapment); People 
v. McWilliams, 96 Misc. 2d 648,409 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Nassau County Ct. 1978) (Penal 
Law exceptions). 
334. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d a t  38, 464 N.E.2d a t  419, 476 N.Y.S.2d a t  51. 
335. 69 N.Y.2d 20, 503 N.E.2d 990, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1986). 
336. Id. a t  27-30, 503 N.E.2d a t  994-96, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t  563-65. 
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In sum, the New York courts have shown a far greater will- 
ingness to monitor grand jury proceedings than the federal 
courts, and have exercised their authority to formulate detailed 
procedural rules to enforce fair standards of practice. The deci- 
sions are not required by constitutional doctrine, but are clearly 
animated by a recognition - inspired by due process concerns 
- that grand juries and prosecutors must conduct themselves 
fairly. However, with respect to  the grand jury, the courts have 
been reticent about explaining the circumstances for invoking 
supervisory power, or seeking to provide a coherent rationale 
for its exercise. The decisions often are inconsistent, highly 
subjective, and do not yield clarifying principles. The courts try 
to balance the fairness model with the functional model. How- 
ever, since both models have a legitimate claim to judicial recog- 
nition, it is virtually impossible to determine in advance which 
model will serve as the basis for decision. 
C. Creating Remedies for Police Misconduct 
To the extent that supervisory power could be used to bar 
the admission of relevant, but illegally obtained, evidence at 
trial, it provides courts with a formidable weapon to protect in- 
dividual rights.337 TO be sure, the traditional justifications for 
supervisory power - deterrence and judicial integrity338 - are 
the same rationales that supported the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Arnendment.339 
However, supervisory power is invoked not to safeguard 
rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution but to enforce 
standards of "civilized justice" that are broader in scope than 
those afforded by constitutional or statutory law. Moreover, the 
use of supervisory power to formulate rules of discovery or mon- 
itor grand jury practice is historically grounded, and ordinarily 
does not affect the accuracy of the truth-seeking process. 
By contrast, the use of supervisory authority to  create an 
exclusionary remedy is neither historically grounded, nor neces- 
sary to further the reliability of the adjudicatory process. In- 
337. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
339. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The justifications are deterrence; 
preservation of judicial integrity; and protecting Fourth Amendment right of pri- 
vacy, id. at 658, 659, 655-56. 
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deed, such a remedy clearly undermines society's interest in 
reliable determinations of guilt. The Supreme Court therefore 
has cautioned that when formulating an exclusionary remedy 
for governmental misconduct, supervisory power "must be spar- 
ingly exercised."340 
1. Fuld-Desmond Debate 
The New York courts have exercised supervisory power to 
provide an exclusionary remedy for governmental misconduct 
even less frequently than they have in the contexts of discovery 
and grand jury practice. In People v. Lane,341 decided by the 
Court of Appeals only eight months after People v. Rosario,342 in 
which the court reversed a capital conviction on the limited 
ground that the prosecutor made a prejudicial closing argu- 
ment,343 the majority opinion briefly noted that a delay in the 
defendant's arraignment had not rendered his confession 
inadmissible.344 
This was the same issue that triggered the supervisory rul- 
ing in McNabb.345 In Lane, it formed the battleground for an 
unusual debate between Judge Fuld, in a concurring opinion, 
and Chief Judge Desmond, in a dissenting opinion. Alluding to 
several United States Supreme Court opinions upholding the 
"imperative of judicial integrity,"346 Fuld emphasized that prin- 
ciples of justice and fair dealing were at the core of many of New 
York's most important common law decisions excluding evi- 
dence because of governmental illegality.347 Then quoting at 
length from McNabb,348 he argued that New York should en- 
340. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,440 (1963). 
341. 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339,223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961). 
342. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881,213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961). 
343. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d at 354,179 N.E.2d a t  340, 223 N.Y.S.2d a t  199. 
344. Id. a t  352, 179 N.E.2d at 339-40, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 198. 
345. McNabb, 318 U.S. a t  341-42. 
346. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206,222 (1960); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
347. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d a t  355-56,179 N.E.2d a t  342,223 N.Y.S.2d a t  201 (Fuld, 
J., concurring). Fuld cited People v. Oakley, 9 N.Y.2d 656, 173 N.E.2d 48, 212 
N.Y.S.2d 72 (19611, which excluded a confession sworn before a judicial officer, 
People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561,175 N.E.2d 445,216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (19611, which 
excluded post-indictment confession, and People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 173 
N.E.2d 35, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53 (19611, which excluded a withdrawn plea of guilty. 
348. 318 U.S. 332, 343-344 (1943). 
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force its prompt arraignment statute in the same manner as the 
Supreme Court did in McNabb, namely, by suppressing any 
confession taken during a period of undue delay.349 
Desmond devoted virtually his entire dissenting opinion 
not to support affirmance of the conviction, which he advocated 
in only one sentence,35O but to respond to Fuld's opinion. He 
wrote, "I say that the adoption by us of such a new exclusionary 
rule of criminal evidence not only is not required by any known 
principle of constitutional law or natural law or morals but is a 
procedural innovation beyond our power to make."351 Although 
Fuld did not dispute the point, Desmond contended that Mc- 
Nabb is neither constitutionally required, nor applicable to the 
states.352 
Desmond distinguished the coul*t's common law power "to 
revise a court-made rule found by experience not to work satis- 
factorily"353 with the creation of a new exclusionary rule. The 
admissibility of confessions and the requirement of prompt ar- 
raignments are covered in New York by precise statutes;354 
their violation "does not license us to add new meanings to 
them."355 Desmond concluded: "No New York court has any 
such supervisory power over the administration of criminal jus- 
tice as is exercised by the United States Supreme Court."356 
2. Creation of Sub-Constitutional Right of Privacy 
There the matter rested for some fifteen years, until the de- 
cision by the Court of Appeals in People v. De Bour.357 Set 
against the backdrop of street encounters between citizens and 
police - euphemistically described in Terry v. Ohio358 as "stop 
and frisk" - De Bour examined whether the police had the 
power to approach and question a citizen when neither probable 
- 
349. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d at 356-57,179 N.E.2d at 342,223 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (Fuld, 
J., concurring). 
350. Id. at 357, 179 N.E.2d at 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 203. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 359, 179 N.E.2d at 344, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 204. 
353. Id. at 360, 179 N.E.2d at 344, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 205. 
354. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 00 165, 395 (McKinney 1961); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
!j 1844 (McKinney 1961). 
355. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d at 360, 179 N.E.2d at 344, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 205. 
356. Id. 
357. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562,386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976). 
358. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). 
Heinonline - -  14 Pace L. Rev. 94 1994 
19941 SUPERVISORY POWER 95 
cause nor reasonable suspicion existed to believe that the indi- 
vidual was involved in criminal activity.359 
Judge Wachtler's opinion addressed the more fundamental 
question: Whether the court has the power to formulate an ex- 
clusionary remedy when the street encounter constituted an un- 
due intrusion into the individual's security and privacy, but did 
not infringe on any. right protected by the Fourth Arnend- 
ment.360 The majority concluded that although no constitu- 
tional right is implicated when a police officer stops a citizen on 
less than 'Younded suspicion," the "spirit of the Constitution has 
been violated and the aggrieved party may invoke the exclu- 
sionary rule."361 Noting that the policing function is "highly 
susceptible to subconstitutional abuses,"362 the court declared 
that such conduct would be "subject to the greatest scrutiny."363 
359. Id. a t  8. 
360. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d at 216-17,352 N.E.2d a t  567-68,386 N.Y.S.2d a t  380- 
81. 
361. Id. In People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 590 N.E.2d 204, 581 N.Y.S.2d 
619 (19921, then-Chief Judge Wachtler, elaborating on the meaning of DeBour, ac- 
knowledged that its decision in DeBour was not constitutionally compelled, id. a t  
195,590 N.E.2d a t  212,581 N.Y.S.2d at 627, but was "largely based upon consider- 
ations of reasonableness and sound State policy." Id. 
The court declined the People's invitation to overrule De Bour on the ground 
that the Supreme Court had firmly held that police-initiated encounters falling 
short of actual seizures of the individual do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 
(1991). The court observed that DeBour has been a vital part of New York's com- 
mon law for nearly 20 years and found "no reason to eliminate entirely its over- 
sight of police encounters that fall below the level of Fourth Amendment seizure." 
Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d a t  196, 590 N.E.2d at 212, 581 N.Y.S.2d a t  627 (emphasis 
added). 
362. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d a t  220, 352 N.E.2d a t  569, 386 N.Y.S.2d a t  382. 
363. Id. The courts have indeed scrutinized such conduct, and have ordered 
the suppression of evidence when police exceeded the limitations established by 
DeBour. See People v. Campbell, 160 AD.2d 363, 554 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1st Dep't 
1990); People v. Stephens, 139 AD.2d 413,526 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1st Dep't 1988); Peo- 
ple v. Ventura, 139 kD.2d 196,531 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1988); People v. Bron- 
ston, 113 A.D.2d 627, 497 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dep't 1986); People v. Fripp, 85 A.D.2d 
547,445 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1981); People v. Branch, 54 A.D.2d 90,387 N.Y.S.2d 
581 (1st Dep't 1976); see also Tetreault v. State, 108 AD.2d 1072,485 N.Y.S.2d 864 
(3d Dep't 1985) (allowing civil damage action against police based on DeBour 
violation). 
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3. Remedies for Statutory Violations 
De Bour is one of a handful of cases in which the New York 
courts even considered invoking supervisory power to fashion 
an exclusionary remedy for governmental misconduct. The 
courts almost always have refrained from creating such a rem- 
edy. One category of cases involves, as in McNabb, the violation 
by the police of a statute which results in a defendant's arrest 
and the acquisition of evidence incident to that arrest. 
Where the police conduct is illegal, but not violative of the 
defendant's constitutional rights, as in McNabb, the principal 
issue addressed by the courts is whether an exclusionary rem- 
edy should be formulated as a sanction for the violation. The 
courts have refbsed to do so unless the violation is sufficiently 
flagrant, is committed in bad faith, and involves circumstances 
where the interests of deterrence and judicial integrity require 
exclusion. 
One such case, People v. Dyla,364 provides a useful illustra- 
tion. The defendant was charged with committing a murder 
while on parole.365 He claimed that his confession to the police 
should have been excluded because it was the product of an ille- 
gal arrest, the illegality being the absence of a parole violation 
warrant as required under the Executive Law.366 The appellate 
division held that "[allthough the arrest could be viewed as un- 
authorized under State law in that no parole violation warrant 
had been obtained, it does not follow that the exclusionary rule 
should be applied as a remedy for this non-constitutional 
irreg~larity."3~~ 
Acknowledging that precedent existed for the exercise of a 
supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained in violation of a 
statute but not in violation of the Fourth Amendment,368 the 
court suggested that the power might be more appropriately in- 
voked where the police conduct was undertaken in bad faith, or 
where the statute in question was designed to implement fourth 
364. 142 A.D.2d 423, 536 N.Y.S.2d 799 (2d Dep't 1988). 
365. Id. at 425, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 800. 
366. N.Y. EXEC. LAW 5 259-i(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1993); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 9, 5 8004.2 (1993). 
367. Dyla, 142 A.D.2d at 429-30, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 803. 
368. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); United States v. Di Re, 
332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
Heinonline - -  14 Pace L. Rev. 96 1994 
19941 SUPERVISORY POWER 97 
amendment rights. Neither condition was present, and thus 
the court "decline[dl to exercise whatever inherent 'supervisory 
power' we may have to nonetheless order suppression."369 
Whether a court chooses to exercise its supervisory author- 
ity to exclude evidence seems to be principally a question of pol- 
icy, rather than power. The courts presumably have the power 
to exclude evidence, but, as a matter of policy, decline to exer- 
cise it. In People v. Dinan,370 in the course of a criminal investi- 
gation into illegal gambling, New York police obtained wiretap 
evidence, which was admitted at The New York State 
Constitution372 and the Code of Criminal Procedure373 author- 
ized the introduction of such evidence, and the Supreme Court 
had held that no constitutional right was thereby infringed.374 
However, wiretapping violated section 605 of the Federal Com- 
munications Act,375 and the Supreme Court had also held that 
evidence acquired from illegal wiretapping was inadmissible in 
federal courts.376 
The issue presented to the New York Court of Appeals was 
whether the conceded violation of a federal law should be reme- 
died by imposing an exclusionary rule in state trials. A major- 
ity of the court analyzed whether an exclusionary rule should be 
read into the federal statute, in much the same fashion that the 
Supreme Court read an exclusionary rule into the Fourth 
Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio377 and Weeks v. United S t a t e ~ . ~ ~ a  
369. DyLa, 142 A.D.2d at 442,536 N.Y.S.2d a t  811. 
370. 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962). 
371. Id. a t  353, 183 N.E.2d at 689-90, 229 N.Y.S.2d a t  408. 
372. N.Y. CONST. art I, $ 12. 
373. N.Y. C m .  PROC. LAW $ 813-a (McKinney 1961). 
374. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,465-66 (1928). 
375. 47 U.S.C. $605 (1989) (formerly 6 U.S.C. $605 (1934)). 
376. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937). 
377. 367 U.S. 643,655-56 (1961) (the exclusionary rule is "an essential part of 
the right to privacy"). Whether the exclusionary rule is "an essential part" of the 
Fourth Amendment right is a disputed question. In United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 348 (19741, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule "is a judi- 
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
party aggrieved." According to the court in Dinan, the exclusionary rule of Mapp 
was held to be binding on the states "[flor reasons of high governmental policy" and 
"to aid in the enforcement of the fundamental law." Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d a t  356, 183 
N.E.2d a t  691, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 410. 
378. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The language in Weeks most closely approximating 
a constitutionally guaranteed exclusionary remedy states: "[Tlhere was involved in 
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The majority concluded that no exclusionary remedy was 
warranted since the statute "may not possess the sanction of a 
- 
constitutional inhibition protecting against fundamental rights 
granting immunity from unreasonable search and seizure."379 
The majority also pointed to McNabb as a significant analogy380 
in that it formulated a non-constitutional exclusionary rule 
which the Court explicitly said was not binding on the states.381 
4. Choosing Constitutional Theory Instead of Invoking 
Supervisory Power 
New York courts have recognized their power to fashion an 
exclusionary remedy even when there is no constitutional re- 
quirement. However, when a court discovers an express consti- 
tutional basis for the remedy, then a fortiori it need not rely on 
its supervisory power. Not surprisingly, due process and super- 
visory power both have been advanced as alternative theories to 
remedy governmental misconduct that violates fundamental 
fairness.382 Faced with this alternative, the Court of Appeals in 
the order rehsing the application (to return the seized property to the defendant) a 
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Id. a t  398. The court in Dinan 
interpreted Weeks as adopting the exclusionary rule not because it was constitu- 
tionally required, "but for the reason that the Supreme Court considered it the 
most effective means of enforcing the constitutional prohibition against unreason- 
able search and seizure." Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d a t  356, 183 N.E.2d a t  691, 229 
N.Y.S.2d at 410. 
379. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d a t  354-55, 183 N.E.2d at 690, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 409. 
380. Id. at 356 n.*, 183 N.E.2d a t  691 n.*, 229 N.Y.S.2d a t  410 n.*. 
381. See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951). In Dinan, Judge 
Fuld wrote a dissenting opinion which was endorsed, interestingly, by Chief Judge 
Desmond, who had criticized Fuld's supervisory power analysis six months earlier 
in People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339,223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961). Fuld 
declared that the "imperative of judicial integrity" compels the Court to formulate 
an exclusionary rule as a matter of New York State law. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d at 357, 
183 N.E.2d a t  692,229 N.Y.S.2d a t  411 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 222 (1960)). 
Fuld said: "[Ilt is the very introduction of the wire-tapping evidence in open 
court, the very disclosure of the intercepted communication to the jury, which vio- 
lates the Federal statute and constitutes the Federal crime." Id. Quoting from his 
concumng opinion in Lane, Fuld concluded that "the court should give sanction 
neither to illegal enforcement of the criminal law nor to the corrosive doctrine that 
the end justifies the means." Id. (quoting People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d a t  357, 179 
N.E.2d a t  342, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 202 (Fuld, J., concurring)). 
382. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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People v. Isaacson383 chose due process rather than supervisory 
power as the basis for dismissing a drug conviction because of 
"inexplicable" and "reprehensible" police conduct.384 
In Isaacson, the police allegedly used threats 'of prosecution 
and physical force to compel a heavy drug user to entrap the 
defendant into selling dr~gs.385 The Fourth Department af- 
firmed the conviction, rejecting the entrapment defense because 
the proof showed that the defendant was predisposed to sell 
drUgs.386 Justice Richard Cardamone, in dissent, argued that 
the court's supervisory power over the administration of justice 
should be invoked to bar prosecution because of the egregious 
police behavi0r.38~ The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction 
and dismissed the indictment, but did so not under its supervi- 
sory authority, but as a matter of due process under the State 
Constitution. The court formulated a four-part test to  deter- 
mine whether the government's conduct reached a sufficient 
level of outrageousness as to violate due pr0cess.38~ 
One can only speculate about why the court chose to base 
the dismissal explicitly on the due process clause of the State 
Constitution, rather than under its supervisory authority. In 
contrast to Cardamone's dissent in the appellate division, the 
Court of Appeals did not even refer to its supervisory power. 
However, since both due process and supervisory power are doc- 
trinal means to achieve fundamental fairness, there would ap- 
383. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). 
384. Id. a t  514, 378 N.E.2d a t  79, 406 N.Y.S.2d a t  715. 
385. People v. Isaacson, 56 A.D.2d 220, 226-27, 392 N.Y.S.2d 157, 162 (4th 
Dep't 1977). 
386. Id. a t  225, 392 N.Y.S.2d a t  161. 
387. Id. a t  231, 392 N.Y.S.2d a t  165 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). 
388. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d a t  521,378 N.E.2d a t  83,406 N.Y.S.2d a t  719. The 
four factors are: 
(I) whether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not 
likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal 
enterprise; (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or im- 
proper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice; (3) whether the defendant's 
reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to humanitarian in- 
stincts such as sympathy or past friendship, by temptation of exorbitant 
gain, or by persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness; and (4) 
whether the record reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no 
reading that the police motive is to prevent further crime or protect the 
populace. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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pear to be some measure of overlap, as Justice Brennan 
suggested in his dissent in Hampton v. United States.389 How- 
ever, there are significant differences between employing due 
process or supervisory power to limit law enforcement power. 
To the extent that supervisory power authorizes judicial 
remedies for governmental misconduct that are not constitu- 
tionally required, the decision is conditional, and presumably 
can be overridden by the legislature; a constitutionally-based 
remedy is not subject to legislative overrule. Additionally, a 
constitutionally-based decision represents a much more power- 
ful judicial condemnation of governmental conduct that violates 
individual rights than a ruling based on supervisory power. 
Further, invoking supervisory power in Isaacson presumably 
would protect the integrity of the judicial process and serve as a 
deterrent to official misconduct. It would not create a right that 
is legally enforceable under the Constitution. A constitution- 
ally-based decision would create a constitutionally enforceable 
right. 
Finally, courts are probably more comfortable, and less vul- 
nerable to criticism based on separation of powers grounds, in 
formulating rights within the traditional parameters of consti- 
tutional interpretation than in devising new remedies outside 
those familiar and well-accepted boundaries.390 The Fuld- 
Desmond debate in People v. Lane underscores this point.391 
From the standpoint of judicial legitimacy, therefore, predicat- 
ing a decision such as Isaacson on due process rather than su- 
pervisory power may be doctrinally more acceptable, and 
prudentially much safer. This is not to say, however, that su- 
pervisory authority lacks legitimacy, either doctrinally or as a 
matter of sound judicial policy. That is the subject of the next 
section. 
389. 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Breman, J., dissenting). 
390. This is not to say that courts are immune from criticism when they in- 
voke the elastic protections of due process. See Ely, supm note 15, at 949 (criticiz- 
ing the Court for formulating a due process principle that Yacks connection with 
any value the Constitution marks as  specialn). 
391. See supm notes 341-56 and accompanying text. 
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VI. Legitimacy of Supervisory Power in New York 
Despite recent decisions of the Supreme Court restricting 
its scope, supervisory power is a familiar and accessible doc- 
trine in the federal c0urts.3~~ The New York courts, by contrast, 
have been more restrained about invoking their supervisory au- 
thority, and have been much less forthright about acknowledg- 
ing that such an authority even exists.393 Cardozo understood 
the potency and volatility of a supervisory authority over crimi- 
nal prosecutions; he deferred for future consideration the occa- 
sions for its exercise.394 Strong judges, particularly Fuld and 
Wachtler, accepted Cardozo's invitation and invoked the court's 
supervisory authority in notable cases. Most often, however, 
supervisory power has been a relatively dormant doctrine in 
New York.395 
The judiciary's traditional reluctance to exercise supervi- 
sory authority is attributable in large part to a conception of our 
governmental structure in which the judiciary is disabled from 
exercising authority that is neither textually based nor within 
the traditional parameters of the common lawmaking process. 
According to this view, supervisory power is an unprincipled 
doctrine that affords judges a general license to roam about and 
invent rules in accordance with the judge's subjective evalua- 
tion of what is "good" or "beautiful."396 
As demonstrated above, supervisory power is neither an ar- 
bitrary nor unprincipled source of power; it is an expression of 
an inherent judicial authority that arises from two distinct and 
legitimate judicial concerns. First, to the extent that supervi- 
sory power seeks to promote justice and fair dealing, it draws 
its inspiration and authority from constitutional principles and 
values.397 Second, supervisory power is firmly rooted in the in- 
392. See discussion supm part 11. 
393. See discussion supra part V. 
. 394. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
395. See discussion supm part V. 
396. See CARDOU), supra note 1, at 141. 
397. American courts, both federal and state, historically have been the prin- 
cipal protectors of fundamental rights and liberties. Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 636 (1886) (describing the Court's historic function "to be watchful for 
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon"); see Wachtler, supra note 123, at 7 ("There can be no doubt that today the 
orthodox view is that the courts, led by the Supreme Court, are the principal archi- 
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herent power of common law courts to mold and revise substan- 
tive, procedural, and remedial rules based on evolving 
considerations of justice and sound public policy.398 
A. Constitutional Justifications for Supervisory Power 
The process of constitutional interpretation has evolved 
into a well-established judicial practice. Marbury v. Madison399 
is the classic pronouncement that a court's constitutional inter- 
pretations are authoritative and final.400 Chief Justice Mar- 
shall's assertion is not self-evident, however, and there is no 
explicit constitutional authority for the doctrine of judicial re- 
view. Indeed, there are few areas of the law as controversial as 
the authority of judges to develop new constitutional 
doctrine .401 
Nevertheless, despite charges of undue judicial activism in 
discovering new rights in such vague constitutional clauses as 
tech of constitutional law and the primary protectors of fundamental human 
rights."); see also A. S. Zuckerman, Miscarriage of Justice and Judicial Responsi- 
bility, 1991 CRIM. L. REV. 492 (judicial function to promote fairness in the adminis- 
tration of justice). Majoritarian institutions such as the executive and legislative 
branches reflect a popular will that can be hostile, or indifferent, to individual 
rights. This tendency is most noticeable in criminal cases, but is also quite evident 
in other areas, particularly with respect to first amendment and equal protection 
guarantees. 
Thus, in the absence of, or in opposition to, executive or legislative action that 
fails to protect individual rights guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions, 
the courts are charged with the ultimate responsibility of interpreting constitu- 
tional and statutory rules to ensure that those protections are enforced. Moreover, 
judicial review has become such an integral part of our governmental order that 
the other branches of government routinely defer to the courts for protecting fun- 
damental rights and liberties. 
398. See discussion supra part IV. 
399. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
400. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 115 (1885) ("the power which courts possess to 
condemn legislative acts which are in conflict with the supreme law should be ex- 
ercised with great caution and even with reluctance"). Acts of the Legislature en- 
joy a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d 604,607, 
563 N.E.2d 705, 706, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (1990). For a recent decision invalidat- 
ing on constitutional grounds an act of the legislature, see State Bankers Ass'n v. 
Wetzler, 81 N.Y.2d 98, 612 N.E.2d 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1993), which struck 
down audit fee provisions of the 1990-91 state operations bill as violative of article 
VII of the New York State Constitution. 
401. See supra note 15. This process has become even more contentious in 
New York recently as judges are increasingly developing a body of state constitu- 
tional law that frequently is in conflict with Federal Constitutional doctrine. See 
supra note 182. 
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due process and equal protection, and claims of judicial usurpa- 
tion of the lawmaking function entrusted to the legislative 
branch, constitutional interpretation to protect fundamental 
rights is a settled part of our legal culture. 
It is in the context of interpreting constitutional guarantees 
that a principled basis for supervisory power can be discovered. 
An examination of the case law in which supervisory power has 
been exercised reflects the traditional common law process op- 
erating to create, in effect, a body of sub-constitutional judge- 
made law rooted in principles of justice and fair dealing. The 
cases typically draw their authority and inspiration from consti- 
tutional values, rather than from the actual constitutional text. 
As Judge Wachtler recognized in. People u. DeBour, the deci- 
sions are grounded in the "spirit of the Constitution,"402 and are 
legitimated based on the function that courts traditionally have 
served as guardians of individual rights.403 The types of cases 
in which the courts have invoked their supervisory power re- 
flect this function. 
Thus, to the extent that criminal discovery protects values 
that inhere in the right to confrontation, the right to effective 
representation, and the right to a fair trial, the court's use of its 
supervisory authority to formulate rules to protect these rights, 
although not explicitly required by the Constitution, is neces- 
sary to protect these rights. This theory easily explains the Ro- 
sario rule. 
Allowing the defense to have access to a witness's prior 
statements to impeach his credibility is more than a technical 
rule of criminal discovery. As the Supreme Court suggested in 
Jencks v. United States,404 it is a quasi-constitutional rule to 
protect the defendant's right to confrontation and his due pro- 
cess right to a fair Indeed, "a right sense of justice" is a 
short-hand articulation of the constitutional values that inhere 
in our adversary system. These values require judicial over- 
sight to ensure that the prosecutor's broad powers are not mis- 
402. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567-68, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1976). 
403. See supra note 397. 
404. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
405. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-363 (1959) ("[Ilt would 
be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface 
of the [Jencks] decisionn) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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used, and that the criminal process does not become skewed too 
strongly in favor of the g0vernment.~06 The goals of deterring 
prosecutorial overreaching.and protecting courts from being ac- 
complices in a miscarriage of justice - the traditional interests 
served by supervisory power - amply justify this exercise of 
judicial authority.407 
Supervisory power is also constitutionally inspired in the 
context of the grand jury. The grand jury's authority derives 
from the constitution, and its power is constrained by very few 
constitutional limitations.408 The privilege against self-incrimi- 
nation and the right to a fair and unbiased grand jury are two 
such constitutionally-based protections. However, these protec- 
tions are not self-executing. Because of the institutionalized 
power of the grand jury and the prosecutor, the secrecy of the 
proceedings, and the limited ability of witnesses to challenge 
excesses of power, the courts have exercised a broad oversight 
to ensure that prosecutors carry out their functions fairly and 
responsibly.409 
Thus, notwithstanding extensive and detailed statutory 
rules regulating grand jury procedure, and in the face of a tradi- 
tional reluctance to interfere with the grand jury's indepen- 
dence, the courts have formulated additional procedural rules 
to limit prosecutorial and grand jury excesses.410 This power is 
inspired by constitutional limitations that are derived from, 
although not mandated by, due process, as well as the privilege 
against self-incrimination.411 People v. Pelchat's formulation of 
a prosecutorial "duty of fair dealing" is one instance of a consti- 
tutionally inspired principle that is enforced through the court's 
supervisory authority.412 The pe jury-trap cases are another 
example of this power.413 
406. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance ofddvan- 
tage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1199 (1960) (describing the "subtle 
erosion of the accusatorial systemn). 
407. See supra notes 18-38, 299-336 and accompanying text. 
408. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text. 
409. See discussion supm part V.B. 
410. See discussion supm part V.B. 
411. See discussion supra part V.C.2. 
412. See supra notes 310-19 and accompanying text. 
413. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, although the courts claim authority in such in- 
stances, they do not necessarily claim finality. The dynamics of 
judicial review in a constitutional democracy is operative. In 
the absence of a constitutionally mandated rule, the legislature 
could override the court's decision and promulgate a statute 
changing or modifying any non-constitutional decision. 
The most problematic instance of supervisory power is the 
creation of remedial rules for non-constitutional violations by 
government officials. Courts in such instances invoke their au- 
thority to oversee conduct of a coordinate branch, and formulate 
remedies for misconduct that are not constitutionally required. 
Courts are most vulnerable in these instance to claims of usur- 
pation of authority. 
Absent a constitutional basis, courts can be viewed as in- 
truding into the sovereignty of a co-equal branch, inventing 
rules based on subjective feelings of outrage, and fashioning 
remedies that disallow evidence probative of a defendant's guilt. 
However, to the extent that the remedy is seen as necessary to 
protect constitutionally-based values such as privacy and per- 
sonal integrity - the kinds of values articulated in People v. 
DeBour - the court's authority is grounded in a judicial tradi- 
tion that requires a party who seeks the court's assistance to  
demonstrate "clean hands."414 
B. Inherent Judicial Power as Justification for Supervisory 
Power 
Apart from a constitutional basis, supervisory power is also 
legitimized as an integral part of the court's inherent power. 
The justifications for the court's inherent power provide similar 
support for supervisory power. As with supervisory power, the 
concept of inherent power is "not susceptible of precise defini- 
tion."415 As such, it "continues to be a vexing problem."416 More- 
414. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) (The governing 
principle has long been settled. It is that a court will not redress a wrong when he 
who invokes its aid has unclean hands.") (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
415. Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445,451,489 N.Y.S.2d 914,920 (2d 
Dep't 1985); see JAMES R. CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 2 (1973): 
Under the inherent powers doctrine a court has all powers reasonably re- 
quired to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to pro- 
tect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions 
effective. These powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because 
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over, the judiciary's uncertainty and hesitancy with respect to 
supervisory power is closely mirrored in the judiciary's ambiva- 
lence over the nature and scope of inherent power. Neverthe- 
less, despite its vague and elastic boundaries, inherent power is 
a firmly established doctrine in the history and custom of judi- 
cial administration and lawmaking, and provides a coherent ra- 
tionale for the use of supervisory power.417 
Inherent judicial power has been recognized in a variety of 
contexts. Principal occasions for its use have included regulat- 
ing the legal profession,418 enforcing courtroom discipline,419 ad- 
ministering housekeeping details and court schedules,420 
protecting the integrity of court record~,4~l assuring adequate 
funding and facilities,4z2 and promulgating rules "which are rea- 
sonably necessary for the administration of justice within the 
scope of their jurisdiction."423 This latter aspect of inherent 
power is analytically similar to the common law power of courts 
to fashion substantive rules governing the merits of a contro- 
versy, procedural rules concerning the conduct of the lawsuit, 
and evidentiary rules concerning the manher in which the mer- 
its of the controversy may be proved.424 It is this traditional 
common law aspect of inherent power that is closely inter- 
twined with the concept of supervisory p o ~ e r . 4 ~ ~  TO the extent 
that both the general common law power and the supervisory 
-- 
the court exists; the court is, therefore, it has the powers reasonably re- 
quired to act as an efficient court. Inherent judicial powers derive not from 
legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the fact it is a 
court which has been created, and to be a court requires certain incidental 
powers in the nature of things. 
Id. 
416. In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445,450,539 N.E.2d 565,568,541 
N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (1989). 
417. See discussion supra part 11. 
418. See supra note 114. 
419. See supra notes 119-22. 
420. See supra note 118. 
421. See supra note 117. 
422. See supra note 115. 
423. Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 449-50, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918 
(2d Dep't 1985). 
424. See Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress 
Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 k. L. REV. 167, 181-82 
(1979). 
425. The courts frequently refer to inherent power when they are analyzing 
the appropriateness of the exercise of supervisory power. See United States v. 
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power formulate rules not required by textual sources such as a 
constitution or a statute, they are guided by similar considera- 
tions, and operate in the same manner. Moreover, they also 
share the same temporal or conditional status, in that such 
rules can be revised by the legislature.426 Supervisory power is 
analytically distinct from the common law rule-making power, 
however, in that its exercise ordinarily is not indispensable to 
deciding the merits of the controversy; it is an attribute of the 
inherent judicial power to administer justice.427 
The place of common law in today's legal topography is rele- 
vant to understanding the role of inherent power generally. 
Notwithstanding the continuing vitality of judge-made law, 
courts and commentators view lawmaking today essentially as 
a legislative function.428 This, of course, was not always the 
case. There were courts before there were legislatures. With- 
out the aid of statutes, the courts breathed life into the earlier 
legal systems by formulating rules on a case by case basis.429 
This power was understood as inherent in the judicial office. It 
was necessary to determine the rights between individuals con- 
cerning private controversies. 
For a variety of reasons - historical, institutional, and 
pragmatic - codes were enacted to displace the common law.430 
The extent to which the judiciary retained the power to change, 
modify, or supplement law in the face of legislation used to be a 
much more contentious subject than it is today.431 The modern 
legislature is understood as the preeminent lawmaking author- 
ity,432 with courts retaining their classic common law power to  
interpret constitutional and statutory law, and in the absence of 
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (describing federal courts' supervisory power as 
an "inherent power"). 
426. CALABRESI, supra note 123, at 92-93. 
427. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text. 
428. CALABRESI, supm note 123, at 2 (What we are dealing with is the slow 
adaptation of our whole legal-political system to a major change: the preponder- 
ance of statutory law."). 
429. See genemlly Thayer, supra note 124. 
430. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 391 et seq. 
(1985); CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (1981). 
431. See supra notes 121-143, and accompanying text. 
432. CALABRESI, supra note 123, at 1. 
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a legislative scheme that addresses the subject, to fill the 
gaps.433 
The extent to which a court invokes its authority to fill 
these gaps, particularly when necessary to protect fhdamental 
values, epitomizes the legislative-judicial dynamic most force- 
fully. The court's inherent authority in such instances is clear; 
whether the court chooses to exercise that authority involves 
prudential concerns. 
There are several theories that justify a court's inherent 
power. Under an instrumentalist theory of inherent power, a 
court requires those powers that are necessary to enable the 
court to function effectively as a court and to administer justice 
in the action.G4 This would include promulgating rules for 
courtroom order and decorum; ensuring that there are adequate 
facilities for litigants, witnesses, and jurors; establishing rules 
for the prompt and efficient disposition of cases; and formulat- 
ing case-related rules so that the proceedings are conducted 
fairly and the merits of the controversy are resolved in accord- 
ance with justice. 
A second theory of inherent power suggests that all judicial 
power in a democracy originally is delegated from the legisla- 
ture and functions under a conditional grant from the legisla- 
ture which can be revoked at will. Chief Justice Marshall put 
the case as follows: 
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the 
laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the 
law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a dis- 
cretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in 
discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is dis- 
cerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is 
never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the 
Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the 
Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the 
To the extent that the legislature does not itself enact positive 
rules to protect individual rights or the conduct of the criminal 
process, there is an implied grant of authority to courts to for- 
mulate rules to  achieve those goals. 
- 
433. See supm notes 257-74 and accompanying text. 
434. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text. 
435. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,866 (1824). 
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A third theory posits that judges, by training, experience, 
and independence, are strategically and temperamentally well- 
suited to identify and implement social values whenever the 
written law does not provide an answer.*36 To be sure, this the- 
ory has a paternalistic quality; it assumes that judges are wise 
persons who will do what is right simply by following their in- 
stincts. However, there is no institutional mechanism save the 
judiciary to identify and implement values that protect the effi- 
ciency and fairness of the judicial process and constrain govern- 
mental conduct that violates individual rights. 
The above theories explain the legitimacy of supervisory 
power in the same manner that they explain the legitimacy of 
inherent judicial power generally. Under an instrumentalist 
view, a court must have the authority to function as a court in 
order to inspire the respect and confidence of the public and the 
litigants. To perform such a role a court must have the author- 
ity to ensure that its processes are not abused, that evidence is 
not tainted, and that attorneys, litigants, and witnesses conduct 
themselves honorably and professionally. 
Under a delegation theory, absent a positive legislative pro- 
nouncement, a court possesses an implied grant of power to su- 
pervise through rule-making the conduct of criminal 
proceedings to  achieve fairness and justice. Such authority is 
conditional, and remains intact until the legislature chooses to 
displace the judge-made rule. And assuming that the legisla- 
tive displacement is consistent with constitutional principles, 
the court would then lack power to change the rule, although it 
would necessarily be empowered to interpret the rule. Finally, 
the third approach authorizes a judge, based on her back- 
ground, independence, and sensitivity, to shape the legal fabric 
to reflect her conception of the fundamental values that under- 
lie criminal proceedings. This is a role inherent in judging, and 
historically has been assumed by common law judges. 
VII. Conclusion 
As an established doctrine, supervisory power is alive, but 
with a guarded prognosis, in the federal courts. Its existence in 
New York has never been clearly established. The courts occa- 
- - -  -- - 
436. CALABRESI, supra note 123, at 95-96; Wachtler, supra note 123, at 11-12. 
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sionally invoke its authority, either expressly or as an implicit 
expression of their inherent power to achieve justice, but the 
doctrine remains shadowy and mysterious. There seems little 
doubt that New York courts have the power to supervise in vari- 
ous settings the processes of criminal justice and the conduct of 
law enforcement officials, and occasionally have exercised that 
power. 
Whether that power is legitimate is a matter of dispute. 
This Article has attempted to  provide principled arguments 
based on constitutional, historical, institutional, and moral 
grounds that serve to legitimate supervisory power. In the end, 
as Cardozo intimated in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 
the issue is not one of judicial power but of judicial policy. 
Whether a court chooses to exercise that power depends on the 
character, temperment, and vision of the judges. 
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